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The  grain  marketing  system  in  China has been  one 
part of the  economy slow to  reform.  While over the 
1990s  there  have  been  considerable shifts  in  policy, 
considerable challenges remain. This book reviews the 
forces for the reform of grain marketing in China and 
their  consequences.  Special  attention  is  paid  to  the 
international  issues  associated  with  reform. 
Suggestions  for  next  steps  in  the  program  are 
identified and some of their consequences reviewed. 
The work is the output of a joint research program 
between  Australia  and  China,  supported  by  the 
Australian  Centre  for  International  Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR). It was also funded in part by the 
Australian  Grains  Research  and  Development 
Corporation (GRDC). This sort of collaborative work 
is  a valuable  contribution to the debate  in  China on 
these issues. The jointness of the work and the access 
to  materials  provide  a  deeper  understanding  of the 
issues and a more realistic assessment of the outlook 
than does work done at greater distance. 
Section  I contains a review of marketing reforms 
over  the  1990s  and  identifies  major  issues  in  the 
reform process. One major factor in the reform process 
has  been  changes  in  grain  demand,  examined  in 
Section 2 with a projection for grain consumption in 
China.  The  scope  for  further  growth  in  output  and 
productivity is a major element in the policy debate in 
China and  in the rest of the  world.  Our assessment, 
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based  to  a considerable extent  on  household  survey 
data collected during our project, is reported in Section 
3. This is followed by a review of China's grain trade 
projections and then of the policy outlook in the grain 
sector. 
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America.  Comments  at that meeting  on  the  work to 
date were critical to the development of the project. 
We  further thank the  members of the  committee, 
led by Professor Robert Undner, which reviewed the 
project for ACIAR, for their constructive suggestions 
on method, output, and marketing. 
Christopher Findlay 
September 1998 Overview 
The  grain  marketing  system  in  China  has  become 
more  competitive  over the  1990s and  domestic  and 
international  prices  have  become  more  closely 
aligned.  But despite  these  reforms,  some  important 
issues have yet to be resolved. 
The  purpose  of this  Report  is  to  doeument  the 
reforms in grain marketing so far and to identify some 
of the forces in the political process in  China driving 
those changes. Within that framework we are also able 
to identify some of the key constraints on reform and 
key issues in the next stages of reform. 
The domestic reforms to date have highlighted a 
number of conflicts, such as  those between exporting 
and  importing  provinces,  on  which  we  have  focus 
below. Other issues relate to the extent of government 
support for the marketing system. In the past, attempts 
to resolve such conflicts have led to a series of cycles 
of reforms in the  domestic marketing system, where 
intervention leads to  crisis,  the  response to  which  is 
another  round  of liberalisation,  to  lead  only  to  the 
discovery  of a  new  set  of  issues  in  the  way  that 
markets operate. The longer-tern1 trend, however, has 
been  towards  a  more  liberal  set  of  marketing 
arrangements. A key issue in the process of reform has 
been the internal transfcr system  .. 
Internal transfers 
A feature of the internal transfer arrangements is the 
provincial  governor  responsibility  system  (PGRS). 
The  essence  of this  system  is  to  make  provincial 
governors responsible for balancing the supply of and 
demand for grain in  their areas of responsibility. That 
includes stabilising areas, raising yields, establishing 
local stocks as required and managing interprovincial 
transfers. The patterns of trade in  grain within China 
are  affected  by  the  processes  of  growth  and 
industrialisation.  The  PGRS  was  an  attempt  to  deal 
with some of the consequences. Loeal governments in 
relatively richer and industrialised areas, where grain 
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output  growth  has  slowed,  were  being  asked  to 
subsidise grain production and marketing so as to keep 
the  price  of grain  lower  in  the  local  markets.  The 
policy was based on  the observation that if prices in 
relatively  richer Southern  China were relatively  low 
and stable, then grain price and supply would be stable 
at the  national  level.  This  aspect of the  policy  dealt 
with Beijing's concern about higher prices in that area 
spreading to the rest of China. 
Our field work reveals the continuing significance 
of  barriers  to  trade  between  the  provinces.  The 
exporting provinces can  restrict volumes in the long-
distance trade because of administrative controls over 
transfers or taxes which are applied in the  congested 
transport infrastructure. Sometimes border barriers are 
also  applied  (e.g.  road  blocks),  although  these  are 
easier to evade. While exporters may use these sorts of 
barriers,  importing  provinces  under  the  PGRS  are 
more likely to apply subsidies to local producers. 
The  grain-exporting  provinces  lose  from  any 
policy  which  reduces  demand  from  their  previous 
customers. The high-income importers may also lose. 
They  are  now  obliged  by  the  Centre  to  follow  a 
strategy which is relatively more costly than that used 
before. It is more costly in  terms of loss of the 
from  specialisation and trade.  The coastal  provinces 
have had long experience in the internal trade in 
and may be less concerned about supply security than 
policy  makers at the  Centre.  Low-income importers, 
on  whom the Centre has applied less pressure to meet 
the targets of the PORS and who were not the focus of 
its  implementation,  may  gain  from  lower  domestic 
market prices than otherwise. 
The developments in the marketing system emerge 
from internal debates in  China about the appropriate 
direction of change. A important set of parameters in 
those  debates  is  prospects  for  the  volume  and 
composition of the demand for grain in China, and the scope for China to maintain the growth rate of grain 
output. The research reported here examined both sets 
of issues. 
Demand outlook 
The  report  contains  a  new  projection  of grain 
demand in-China. We find that: 
with an income growth rate of 8 per cent and in a 
low  feed-grain  use  efficiency  scenario,  China's 
demand for  total  grain  will  be 523  mt a year by 
2000,585 mt a year by 2010 and 643 mt a year by 
2020; 
the results show that demand for feed grain will be 
the  only  major  driving  force  in  the  growth  of 
demand  for  grain  in  China from  the  year  2000 
onwards; 
the  combined  effects  of  income  growth  and 
change in  population structure lead to a fall in the 
demand for food grain; 
•  the pace of the increase in demand for feed grain 
and the decline in demand for food  grain will  be 
very sensitive to the rate of income growth; 
a change in  the efficiency of feed  grain  use will 
make  a significant difference to China's demand 
for feed grain. 
These results therefore highlight the  sensitivity of 
projections  to  the  outlook  for  income  growth,  to 
demographic  trends  such  as  the  age  mix  of  the 
popUlation  as  well  as  urbanisation,  and to  changes  in 
feed-grain use efficiency. The sensitivity to changes in 
feed-grain use rates is even greater in absolute terms in 
the  high  income  growth  scenario,  since  there  the 
importance of grainfed  meat  in  food  consumption  is 
then  even greater.  One implication is that in  the meat 
sector, new  research and technology transfer, the latter 
associated with foreign investment for example, could 
have significant implications for the outlook for  grain 
consumption and for China's trade in  grain. This point 
highlights  the  value  of further  study  not  only  of the 
parameters examined here but also China's research and 
development, the reform of basic research institutions 
as well as the changes in the extension systems, where 
significant issues have been identified in other research. 
Scope for productivity growth 
Given the constraints on land supply in China, the key 
issue  on  the  supply  side  is  the  scope  for  further 
productivity growth in agricultural production, in grain 
production in particular. This issue has been a focus in 
the  policy debate in China.  This  was  highlighted by 
trends in grain output per head in China. A rising trend 
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in output per head  was established in the  mid-1960s, 
but output per head appeared  to  stagnate  around  the 
mid-1970s. The introduction of the  reform process in 
the late 1970s marked a turning point. Grain output per 
head rose on a new  trajectory and reached  a peak in 
1985. Thereafter, however, once again output per head 
appears to have stagnated. 
Research reviewed here indicates that it is possible 
to  raise  the  productivity  of  inputs  used  in  grain 
production  in  China,  and  therefore  output per head, 
but the condition required for this change is  an  even 
greater role  for  markets in  the  management of grain 
production. Contributors include: 
plot consolidation, facilitated by the development 
of  land  use  markets,  and  by  other  market 
mechanisms for dealing with risks that producers 
may face on consolidated plots; 
development  of  markets  for  other  purchased 
agricultural inputs; and 
•  deregulation of the seed market. 
The greater degree of integration of domestic grain 
markets  would  also  have  significant  effects  on 
aggregate  output,  through  opportumtles  for 
specialisation and  trade  and  the  effects  on  technical 
efficiency  at  farm  level.  Pressures  for  structural 
change that vary between regions will at the same time 
be  changing the  mix  of  output that China can 
expect. These pressures will determine the patterns of 
trade  in grain  in China that  emerge  in  an  integrated 
national market. 
Despite the likely gains in economic terms, there 
are constraints to the deepening of the role of markets 
in  the grain sector in  China. As noted above, market 
development  inevitably  leads  to  substantial 
redistributive  effects,  and  therefore  conflicts, 
involving  growers  of grain,  trading  intermediaries, 
input  suppliers  and  consumers.  A  particularly 
important issue in that context is the role of the grain 
bureaus  which  have managed the  implementation of 
policy on purchases and distribution. 
It is also possible to shift out the grain production 
frontier.  Substantial  increases  in  yields  even beyond 
those  at  the  frontiers  under  current  technologies 
appear to  be possible.  The  issue in that  case is  the 
management  and  evaluation  of  research  and 
development  programs  that  apply  to  grain. 
Institutional changes in  the research sector and in the 
seed industry are key objectives. In addition to market 
reforms, thcrefore, important issues include: 
the  extent  of public  investment  in  agricultural 
infrastructure and in research and development; the design of the extension system; and 
•  the  long-run  development  of fanner  education 
policy. 
While China can change its trend in  grain output 
per head, the question to be answered is  what it  will 
cost to change the trend. There are refonns, including 
the  development of input markets and the integration 
of output  markets,  that  may  be  undertaken  through 
regulatory refonn at relatively low cost. Going further 
could  involve  more  substantial  investment  and 
therefore lead to challenges to policy makers to make 
careful judgments about costs and benefits. 
Using  the  resources  available  in  the  rest of the 
world to supply grain to China is another option to be 
considered.  Integration  of  the  domestic  and 
international  markets  for  grain  will  also  assist  the 
assessment of all  those options by providing decision 
makers with price benchmarks for assessing costs and 
benefits of project proposals. 
International markets 
There appears to be a narrowing of the  gap between 
international and domestic prices in China. But is this a 
stable  position  and  does  it reflect  a  commitment  to 
Trade outlook 
develop a greater degree of integration of domestic and 
international markets? Or is it a step along a path from 
taxing agriculture to another point at which agriculture, 
including  grain  producers,  receives  a  much  greater 
level of SUppOIT from the rest of the community'? 
One  possibility  is  that  the  introduction  of  the 
PGRS  signals the  institutional evolution of a change 
towards  a  higher  level  of support  for  agriculture. 
However,  the  domestic  political  forces  in  that 
direction  which  were  observed  in  other East  Asian 
economies  are  not  so  strong  at  this  stage  in  China. 
Fanner groups are yet to be come the strong political 
force  they  are elsewhere. Field work  and 
the  observation  of the  growth  of the  township  and 
village enterprise (TVE) sector in rural China indicate 
that  alternative  employment opportunities  are  many 
and nearby. Costs of adjustment out of agriculture are 
therefore smaller. 
The  international  implications  of China's  policy 
choices  in  agricultural  markets  also  matter  in  the 
domestic debate. China can have significant effects on 
global  markets.  Those  impacts  have  attracted 
considerable attention in the world media, and a further 
objective of this report is to highlight the relevance of a 
While there is no agreement on reasonable supply growth assumption, a simple supply projection provides a 
background against  which  to  judge the  sensitivity of the  trade  projections  to  the  variations  in  demand 
parameters stressed. 
We assume that in 1995 demand for food grain was met in net tenns by local supply and that China will 
be able to meet its (declining) demand for food grain from 2000 onwards, at least in net tenns  China will 
show food-grain  self-sufficiency.  This  is  an  important assumption  about China's policy stance which is 
examined further, below. 
We  also  assume  that  the  annual  growth rate  of feed-grain  production  is  assumed  to be  3  per cent 
throughout the projection period, based on  the growth of maize output in  the past  10  years.  Under these 
assumptions, China's total grain supply in  the  year 2000 will be 494 mt,  very close to  the  government's 
500 mt target.  The implied annual total grain output growth  will  be  about  1.1  per cent over this  period, 
slightly higher than the growth rate of 0.9 per cent achieved since the refonn. This growth rate falls to about 
0.6 per cent from the year 2000 to 2020, a decline from the previous trend, which may be reasonable, given 
the very likely rise of opportunity cost of increasing grain production in China. As projected, China will be 
producing 521  mt a year by 2010 and 555 mt a year by 2020. 
The trade implications in quantity tenns of these projections will rely on the choice of economic growth 
and feeding efficiency scenarios. If the 8 per cent income growth rate is chosen. under the low feed-grain use 
efficiency scenario, China needs feed-grain imports of 29 mt a year by 2000, 64mt a year by 20 I  0, and 88 mt 
a year by 2020. 
Under the high feed grain use efficiency scenario China will still enjoy a surplus by 2000 and balance by 
2020, which is unlikely to be possible. If the results under low efficiency are scaled down by 25 per cent to 
reflect some improvement efficiency, China will still need feed imports of 22 mt a year by 2000,48 mt a year 
by 2010 and 66 mt a year by 2020. 
11 substantial  body  of  research  to  these  issues.  An 
important contribution here is to differentiate between 
types  of grain,  in  particular,  between  food  grain  and 
feed  grain. The box below summarises an outlook for 
China's trade in gram to 2020. 
Views of  f(}od security 
Experience to  date has shown that food  grain policy 
has always dominated policy choices  this position 
is reflected in the projections in the box above. During 
the rounds of marketing reform and retreat after late 
1993,  the  government  acted  to  ensure  food  grain 
supplies, even at  a cost to  regional specialisation and 
interdependence.  This  position,  however,  has 
important implications which  include the creation in 
the  feed-using  sector  of a  set  of political  interests 
which favours the current regime. 
The extent of protection for the feed grain sector is 
likely  to  be  relatively  low  compared  to  other food 
processing  sectors,  and  also  low  relative  to  grains 
which  are directly  consumed.  If so,  the  diversion of 
crop  land  to  food  grain  production  would  imply 
greater  reliance  on  world  markets  for  feed  grain 
imports. The feed-using sectors would  from such 
a policy  regime.  They  would  be able to buy  feed at 
prices which are relatively closer to world  than 
are the prices for their outputs, which are likely to be 
higher.  In  such a situation, the feed-using sectors are 
therefore larger than otherwise. and the  of self 
sufficiency in those products in China would be higher 
than otherwise. 
A further implication of this  situation is  that the 
trade pattern shifts towards  trade  in  feed  rather than 
trade in products which are directly consumed. China 
in this scenario also shifts its international grain trade 
in the long run  towards imports of feed grains - and 
to  a greater extent than would  be  the  case in  a free 
trade regime.  Imports of grains directly consumed -
wheat  and  rice  are  reduced.  Imports  of  other 
agricultural products such as meat ,which use grain are 
also lower than otherwise. 
This trade policy stance also affects the location of 
investment.  More  foreign  firms  than  otherwise  are 
likely to invest in the food processing sector in China, 
including in  meat production. They  from access 
to  the  protected  local  market  while  being  able  to 
purchase  inputs at  prices closer to  world prices than 
are the prices at  which they sell their products. In the 
longer run, the interests of these foreign firms become 
more closely identified with local groups arguing the 
case for self-sufficiency in items finally consumed. 
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Research reported herc highlights the heterogeneity 
of food products in terms of their factor intensity, and 
this  research  suggests  an  alternative  perspective  on 
food security. 
There is  a  common  belief that  the  overall  food 
sector will follow the path of the grain  trade and face 
an  increasing volume of net imports. But we observe 
strong  export  growth  in  some food  products  which 
might  be  explained by  the  consistency  between  the 
factor intensities in  the production of those items and 
China's  factor  endowments.  In  other  words,  rapid 
export growth of those items may be consistent with 
China's comparative advantage within the  agriculture 
sector.  A  shift  in  the  focus  of policy  towards  the 
efficiency objective might therefore lead to the growth 
of exports of some foods as well as imports of others. 
A policy of self-sufficiency in grain as well as the 
overall food sector is possible but costly in economic 
terms.  Free  trade  is  the  alternative.  The  important 
observation is that free trade may lead to the exchange 
of  'food  for  food'.  Exports  of other  manufactured 
items may well generate the foreign exchange required 
to  fmance  the  growth  in  grain imports in  free  trade. 
Another scenario  is  that  exports  of other  foods  will 
also  increase.  The answer to  the  question  'who will 
feed  China?'  is  that China will feed  itself but  do  so 
through  trade.  Sources  of export  income  to  finance 
grain imports might actually emerge, not only from the 
other export  sectors  of the  economy,  but  also  from 
within the food sector itself. 
Liberalisation  of  the  grain  trade  would  also 
contribute to meeting the concerns about food security 
in China since it would contribute to economic growth 
and  would  widen  the  margins  between  food 
consumption and subsistence levels,  lead  to  gains  in 
economic efficiency and therefore output from greater 
regional and national specialisation, including in other 
food  sector  products,  and  involve  sourcing  grain 
imports  from  a  variety  of  suppliers  which  would 
ameliorate  China's  sense  of vulnerability  to  threats 
from world markets. 
This  perspective  suggests  substantial  gains  from 
regional specialisation and the  transmission  of world 
market prices  throughout the  domestic  market.  How 
quickly can China reap those gains? That depends on 
the  progress of the reforms in  the grain markets and 
the capacity of China to deal with the range of issues 
which history  highlights  and  which are  examined in 
this Report. 1. Grain Marketing Reforms in the 1990s
1 
Developments in the domestic grain 
market 
Marketing arrangements' 
China's grain market reform has passed through 
three main phases. 
1978-84: initial liberalisation 
The first stage combined large increases in state grain 
purchase prices, continued state control of the bulk of 
grain  distribution  and  the  emergence of small-scale 
free trading among peasants and urban residents. Once 
begun, however, the logic of free market development 
started  to  take  efTect.  Peasants  preferred  to  sell  to 
merchants than to spend all day sitting in small local 
markets. Merchants took on the role of aggregation of 
products to supply to larger markets, and a network of 
trade began to emerge. Eventually in  1984 the growth 
of  this  free  market  system  was  approved  by  the 
government  and  peasants  were  allowed  to  sell  their 
surplus grain in markets, once they had supplied their 
quota. 
The  growth  in  the  subsidies  from  the  central 
budget  over  this  period  was  perhaps  the  most 
important  motive  for  the  reform.  As  the  state  was 
committed to purchase all the marketable grain from 
producers  at  increased quota and  over-quota  prices. 
the  market  risks  of grain  production  were  actually 
undertaken  by  the  state.  This  gave a  boost to  grain 
production,  and.  subsequently,  to  state  subsidies  for 
grain marketing. The system of quota and over-quota 
prices was also attractive to  producers who "ought to 
sell more and more of their grain at over-quota prices. 
IThis part is an edited version of  Cheng, Findlay and Watson (19%). 
For a review of  the pre-refonn marketing system see Findlay. Martin 
and Watson (1993). 
2 This section is based on Watson (1996), and also Watson and 
Findlay (1995). 
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The  over-quota  state  prices  after  1980  were  higher 
than market prices. Eventually, it was not possible for 
the state to pay all  the subsidies to the grain bureaus 
which were responsible for implementing the purchase 
program. and the grain bureaus in many areas, in turn, 
refused to purchase grain from  farmers  at over-quota 
prices.  These  issues  contributed  to  the  pressure  for 
reform. 
1985-92: the contract system 
With the successful development of  grain production in 
response  to  the  higher  prices,  the  second  stage  of 
reform  was  launched  in  1985.  The  unified  purchase 
and sales system was replaced by the contract system, 
state prices were fixed on the 70:30 ratio of quota and 
over-quota  prices,  and  free  markets  and  negotiated 
sales were opened up.  The state system was thus  still 
concerned to ensure stable supplies at controlled prices. 
These price adjustments were. however, a negative 
signal  to  peasants.  At the  same time.  the  growth of 
townships  and  village  enterprises  (TVEs)  and  the 
diversification of production made grain less attractive 
to producers (discussed further, below). The result was 
a period of stagnation and fluctuation in grain output. 
The state  responded  by enforcing the  contracts  to  a 
greater  degree  and  by  increasing  incentives  to 
producers  to  grow  grain.  The  economic  austerity 
period  after  1988  also  'cooled  down'  the  non-
agricultural  economy.  and grain  production began to 
increase again. 
Against  that  background,  significant  changes  in 
consumption and the shift to better quality and variety 
was  leading to  a change in the structure of demand. 
These changes are discussed in more detail in Section 
2. Direct grain consumption was declining and indirect 
consumption was rising. The significance of grain for 
many  consumers  was  becoming  less  important,  and 
more  and  more  people  were prepared to  pay  higher 
prices for quality food. During  this  period.  therefore,  the  level  of state 
subsidies  to  the  grain  system  began  to  grow 
substantially  and  embraced  all  areas,  including 
producers, handlers and consumers. In the context of 
the consumption changes just mentioned, the decision 
was made JO attempt a further stage in market reform. 
1992 onwards: marketisation and retreat 
The most recent round of reform began  in  1991  and 
1992 with  increases  in selling  prices  which  reduced 
government subsidies to consumers. This was followed 
by calls to reform the grain bureaus, a decentralisation 
of grain  management  and  a  rapid  spread  of market 
liberalisation  across  the  country.  The  aim  was  to 
'decontrol the purchasing and marketing price of grain, 
to  arouse  the  enthusiasm of grain  producers  - and 
especially  the  major  grain  producing  areas  to 
produce more good quality  and give full scope to 
these areas' capacity for grain production, so that there 
will be a rational regional division of labour.'3 
The optimism for reform was dashed, however. by 
a grain market crisis. Problems at this time included: 
continuous rises of grain prices, initially in the rice 
market; 
worsening barriers to internal trade; 
rising  concern about lack of control,  since state 
actions  such  as  the  release  of grain  stock  and 
issuing  a  price  ceiling  had  little  effect  on  the 
increases in prices; 
•  complaints from consumers about rising prices of 
grain, meat, and all other farm goods. 
Studies  of China's  grain  trade  show  that,  since 
1993,  market  prices  of grain  in  China  have  risen 
substantially  and  approached  world  prices.  This 
suggests an increased integration between Chinese and 
international grain markets (Cheng and Findlay 1995). 
It has  been  argued  that,  with  the  convergence  of 
Chinese and world grain prices, China has come to a 
turning point where it risks the shift from a policy of 
taxing to assisting grain producers (Garnaut, Cai, and 
Huang 1996). 
Changes in nominal rates of protection4 
Many different methods are used in economic analysis 
to measure degrees of protection of domestic markets. 
The nominal rate of protection is the simplest indicator 
which  directly  compares  the  difference  between 
---_  .... _-- ..... _---
3 State Council of  China. 'Decision on developing a high-yielding. 
high grade and efficient agricultural system'. September 1992. 
4 This section was prepared by Huang Yiping and is based on Chapter 
7 of Huang (1996). 
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domestic and border prices.  A  score of zero  fo~ the 
nominal  rate  of  protection  implies  free  trade  (no 
protection).  while a number larger than  zero implies 
positive protection of the domestic market (domestic 
price is  higher than the border price), and a number 
less  than  zero  implies  negative  protection.  The 
nominal rate of protection is  a convenient measure to 
apply  because  its  calculation  requires  only  limited 
data.  Difficulties  often  occur  when  choosing  an 
appropriate  border  price  (considering  quality 
differences  and  potential  transportation  costs)  and 
exchange rate (especially if there is not a free market 
for foreign exchange). 
In the calculation of the nominal rate of protection 
for  China's  most  important  agricultural  products  in 
1978-94,  the  secondary  foreign  exchange  rate  was 
used  (see  Table  1).  A  convincing  secondary  market 
exchange rate did not exist before 1986. These figures 
must therefore be examined with caution, especially 













Nominal rate of protection for grain and oil 
crops, 197894 (%). 
Wheat  Rice  Maize  Oil-bearing crops 
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-12  -53  -10  -43 
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-12  -31  -15  -33 
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Note: Domestic market prices (and the over-quota prices hefore 1984) 
are converted through the secondary market exchange rate. 
International prices are average prices reported in Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FAO Yearbook: 
production, FAO. Rome, various issues. 
Sources: Personal communication, Ministry of Agriculture. China; 
International Monetary Fund. various years, International Financial 
Statistics, IMF, Washington. D.C.; Garnaut, Cai and Huang 1996; 
Gamaut. Guo and Ma, (cds), The Third Revolution in the Chinese 
Countryside. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: 185-200. 
The  nominal  rate  of protection  for  wheat,  rice, 
maize and  oil-bearing crops in the second half of the 
19808  indicates  that  all  products  were  heavily  and 
negatively protected, reflecting the continuation of the 
pre-reform  discriminating  agricultural  policies. 
Although positive numbers occurred for some products 
during  this  period,  the  nominal  rate  of  protection 
normally ranged from around -10% for wheat, about -40% for rice, -15% for maize and -45% for oil crops. 
The first  year that China's main agricultural products 
experienced  a  unified  drop  in  the  nominal  rate  of 
protection  was  1993.  It  resulted  from  the  rise  in 
domestic  prices  over  the  last  quarter  of the  year. 
Continued. and more rapid increases in domestic prices 
in 1994 pushed the nominal rate of protection nearer to 
zero with some positive numbers marking an important 
historical turning point. By mid·1994, domestic prices 
exceeded international prices for wheat and maize, and 
for rice by September 1994, despite large increases in 
world  rice  prices  following  Japan's  entry  into  the 
market as an importer (Garnaut, Cai and Huang 1996). 
In calculating comparative aggregate cereal prices 
in  both  domestic  and  international  markets,  the 
commodities  included  are  wheat,  rice  and  maize, 
accounting  for  95.5%  of  China's  total  cereal 
production  and  84.7%  of  its  grain  consumption 
(Figure 1). Both international and domestic priccs are 
weighted  by  the  output  share  of  individual 
commodities in China's production. 
While a significant upward movement in  the price 
of rice in 1994 had an impact on the international prices 
calculated for  China,  rice  accounted for  only  a small 
share  in  world grain trade.  Even  when  a larger-than-
usual effect of rice price increase is  incorporated into 
the calcnlation of international prices, it is still clear that 
China's domestic cereal  prices and international prices 
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converged  quickly  in  1994.  By  July  1994,  domestic 
prices were similar to international prices, and outpaced 
international prices in the months that followed. 
According  to  Lin  and  colleagues  (1996),  the 
increases in prices since late 1993 were caused mainly 
by  the  increases  in  urban  incomes  and  wages, 
associated with a capital investment boom in  1993 and 
1994, and by  the intervention of local governments in 
grain marketing. Others emphasise the influence of the 
stlUctura1  change  in  China's  grain  supply  on prices, 
namely,  the  reduction  in  output  of indica  rice  in 
Southern China where the comparative advantage of 
grain production declined rapidly after the economic 
reform  (Chen  Xi wen,  1995).  The rapid  increases  in 
grain  prices  after  1993  nevertheless  sent  a  warning 
signal to the Chinese authorities which had considered 
the stable supply of grain at relatively cheap prices to 
urban populations an important economic and political 
issue in China. 
Controls over purchases were reintroduced, price 
management was strengthened again and mechanisms 
such as the governor production responsibility system 
(see  below)  were  introduced  to  encourage  greater 
regional self-sufficiency. 
In  addition  to  the  question  of subsidies  in  the 
marketing system, to  which we return below, another 
issue highlighted  at  this  time  was  the  availability of 
credit in the marketing system. 
---
Jan  March  May  July  Sap! 
1993 
Nov  Jan  March  May  July  Sap! 
1994 
Nav 
Figure 1.  International and Chinese cereal prices, 1993-94 (U5$/t). 
Note:  Cereal  are average prices of wheat, rice and maize weighted by their output shares in China's production. China's domestic prices 
are market  in rural and urban fairs converted using the swap exchange rale, and international prices are f.o.b. Gulf of No.  I hard red winter 
(ordinary protein) for wheat. f.o.b. Bangkok, white milled 5% broken for rice and US exports prices are f.o,b, Gulf of 1','0,2 yellow for maize, 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D,C., various issues; State 
Planning Commission and Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing. 
15 Commercial credit 
One of the continuous problems of the  grain system 
has  been that of obtaining enough  credit  to  pay  the 
peasants.  The  problem of TOUs  (baitiao) has  arisen 
many  times  since  the  mid-1980s.  Cheng (1995)  has 
shown  that  this  has  been  the  result  of  market 
distortions  and  the  inconsistency  of  institutional 
reforms. State price rises and the growth in market and 
negotiated sales have increased the overall demand for 
commercial  credit.  The  supply  of credit through  the 
Agricultural Bank of China and  the grain bureaus has 
been affected, however, by  the diversion of funds for 
other uses.  Grain loans earn  low  returns  and  are not 
popular  with  the  banks.  The  problems  of the  grain 
bureaus, in particular, have been very important. They 
have used grain purchase funds  for other investment, 
and  a large bank debt has  been accumulated for past 
grain-handling  whieh  is  the  subject  of dispute.  The 
banks  argue  that  these  are  commercial  losses  for 
which  the  grain  bureaus  bear  responsibility.  The 
bureaus argue  that the losses are policy-induced and 
should be subsidised by the government. In effect the 
fact that the grain bureaus and the banks were not full v 
commercial  agencies  meant  that  they  could  pursu~ 
their  own  interests  in  seeking  both  profits  and 
government subsidies. The result was  loss of income 
by producers, misuse of funds,  an increase  in  budget 
deficits  and a slowdown in  the  formation  of a rural 
credit market.  The  recent growth  of the  rural credit 
funds  outside  the  banking  system  is  an  example of 
how,  in  the  absence  of a  well-ordered  rural  credit 
market, a segmented credit market will grow to try to 
solve some of the problems of local credit supply. 
Subsidies 
In  a  situation  where  government  management  of a 
large  proportion  of  marketing  continues  and  low 
purchase prices mean producers face low incentives, 
the  provision of budget subsidies becomes important 
to  meet the  government's target of maintaining high 
levels  of  self-sufficiency.  The  importance  of  the 
subsidies for producers has grown substantially since 
the  late  1980s. The government also aims  to  protect 
consumers, especially those on low incomes, by trying 
to  keep  selling  prices  stable,  at  the  same  time  as 
having  to  subsidise  the  grain  bureaus.  Watson  and 
Findlay  (1995)  underline  the  many  problems  these 
high  levels  of  subsidy  create.  They  generate 
competition  between  producers,  handlers  and 
consumers to obtain the highest benefits. By  1991, the 
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subsidies  had  reached  very  high  levels  and  were 
causing budgetary problems. The selling price reforms 
of 1991  and  1992  were  intended to  reduce  those  by 
removing  consumer  subsidies.  The  market  reforms 
aimed to eliminate subsidies in  the handling systems. 
The retreat from  the  markets and  the introduction of 
the  governor  responsibility  system  have  meant, 
however,  that  subsidies  have  not  yet  entirely 
disappeared. 
Each phase of  market reform was thus followed by a 
crisis. These crises involved economic conflict between 
producers, handlers and consumers for  the benefits of 
subsidies, and the drain on central government budgets 
created  by  the  payment  of those  subsidies.  How  a 
response in the longer run to this issue was to relocate 
the responsibility  for the payment of the subsidies  to 
local governments is discussed below. 
Patterns of internal tradeS 
An  important factor in the changes in the grain sector 
are  the  forces  from  the  rest of the economy  on  the 
agricultural sector as a whole, and on the composition 
of agricultural output. Gross agricultural output grew 
more  than  9%  annually  in  real  terms  in  the  reform 
period  up  to  1984,  and  at  nearly  6%  per  year 
thereafter.  Agricultural  output  in  total  continued  to 
grow  although  grain  output  growth  slowed  down. 
Contributing  factors  were  the  changes  in  relative 
prices  for  different  crops  and  other  agricultural 
products,  which  were  induced,  in  the  short term,  by 
different rates  of reform  in  marketing arrangements, 
and the reversion of land once used for grain to more 
suitable uses. 
Other forces acting on  agriculture are those from 
growth in the whole economy and from the process of 
industrialisation. The accumulation of capital and its 
reinvestment in other sectors shifts the mix of output 
and draws  some  of the  mobile factors  of production 
out  of  agriculture.6  Depending  on  the  pace  of 
technological  change  in  agriculture  the  agriculture 
sector is  under pressure  to  decline  (relative  to  other 
sectors in a growing economy).? 
The extent of the change in the opportunity cost of 
agricultural output varies between regions. As a result, 
5 This section is based on Cheng, Findlay and Watson (1996). 
6 Findlay, Watson and Wu (1994) discuss the gruwth of the TVE 
sector in this context 
7 See Rozelle (1996) for a discussion of current issues in research and 
development in agriculture and also Anderson (1987) for discussion 
of  forces of agriCUltural sector decline in association with economic 
growth, Xinjiang 
Tibet 
More than 70% 
I:=J 50%  to 70% 
c::::::=J  30%  to 50% 
c::::::=J  Less than 30% 
Figure 2.  Grain output growth by provinces. 1978-95. 
Source: Yang Hong, 1996 ... updated. 
the  comparative  advantage  in  agriculture  change,' 
between  regions.  which  affects  inter-regional  trade 
patterns.  These  trends  also  have  interesting 
implications  for  the  mix  of  grain  output  and  for 
China's  international  grain  trade.  The  extent  of the 
changes in  grain specialisation and trade within China 
illustrates  the  significance  of  the  processes  of  the 
change in  the structure of the rest of the economy for 
the  agriculture  sector,  including  grain.  The  changes 
also illustrate the scope for gains from trade associated 
with specialisation within China, including within the 
agricultural sector. 
Yang  Hong (1996a,  b)  has  identified changes  in 
the  location  of grain  production  in  China. She finds 
significant  variation  between  regions  in  the  rate  of 
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output growth. Figure 2 shows the provinces classified 
by the rate of output growth to  1995. Clearly the faster 
rates  of growth  are  concentrated  in  north em China. 
The areas  where output  is  growing more  rapidly are 
located in  northern China. The growth in grain output 
since  the  start  of the  reform  program  and  the  early 
1990s  was  more than  70%  in  Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang,  Ningxia and  Xinjiang  compared to  the 
national  average growth rate over the  same period of 
just  over  53%.  The  southern  provinces  of  China 
remain  relatively  large  in  terms  of total  output,  but 
their share has declined. 
One important consequence has been a redirection 
in  the patterns  of trade.  The country can  be divided 
into  ditlerent  regions,  Northeast,  North,  Northwest, Xinjiang 
Imports or exports 
<100000 tons 
Exports > 100 000 tons 
Imports> 100 000 tons 
Figure 3.  Grain transfers by province. 1993. 
SOllrce: Yang Hong.  1996a 
Southeast,  Southwest,  and  Middle  China. 
Traditionally, grain flowed from the Northeast and the 
Southeast  to  the  Southwest,  the  Northwest  and 
sometimes  to  the  North,  while  the  middle  was 
basically self-sufficient.  After the reforms,  there  was 
growth of output  in  the  Northeast, the  North, and  to 
some extent in  the Middle (see Figure 2).  There was 
lower growth in  the Southeast. The implication was a 
redirection  of trade  towards  the  Southeast.  Figure 3 
illustrates the new direction of the tlow of grain. The 
larger net importers in  absolute terms are now located 
in  the southern part of China. 
Figure 4 shows the net transfers as a percentage of 
apparent consumption (production plus imports minus 
exports).  The  map  illustrates  more  clearly  the  point 
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that  the  main  issue  in  the  management  of internal 
transactions is in the Southeast, where the comparative 
advantage declined the fastest. The faster-growing and 
more  rapidly  industrialising  southern  provinces  are 
losing  their  comparative  advantage  within  China  in 
grain production (see Yang Hong, 1996c, for empirical 
work on this process). 
The composition  of the  national  output of grain 
and of the grain traded within China is  also changing. 
Maize,  in  which  northern  China  has  a  comparative 
advantage,  is  now  more  important  in  both  output. 
especially since  the  mid-1980s, and internal  trade.  In 
volume terms, maize now aCCollnts for nearly a quarter 
of total grain output, compared to  18% in  1978. 




c==J  of more than 1  % 
Deficit region 
_  of more than 12% 
of 8% to 12% 
c::::J  of 1  % to 8% 
Figure 4:  Net transfers as a percentage of apparent con slim pt ion,  1993. 
Source:  Adapted from  Yang  Hong  1996a. 
(I  996b), is  the greater exposure of the production of 
grain  to  volatility  on  the  supply  side.  The  ,hare of 
national  maize output in  Heilongjiang, lilin, Liaoning 
and  Hebei  has  increased.  Maize  output is  becoming 
more  concentrated  in  those  provinces,  which  may 
expose maize supply to greater volatility, for example, 
as a consequence of common shocks from the weather 
affecting all those provinces. 
New patterns  of specialisation  and  internal  trade 
have  created  challenges  for  the  domestic  transport 
infrastructure.  Yang  Hong  (1995b)  quotes  research 
published in  China which suggests that constraints in 
that system have in  the past led to international maize 
exports  in  preference  to  sale  within China. and have 
limited  the  extent  of  specialisation  in  maize 
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production  in  those  regions.  Self-sufficiency  policy 
targets have reinforced this constraint on the extent of 
specialisation. But al.  0  infrastructure congesrion  has 
reinforced  the  concern  at  central  government  level 
about the risks of relying on the rest of China for grain 
supplies to deficit areas. 
Yang  Hong (1996d) has also examined the  policy 
of the  so-called  'grain  base areas'. The core idea of 
this  policy  was  (0  concentrate  grain  production  in 
areas  which  have  a  comparative advantage.  But  the 
development  of commodity  grain base areas has  been 
affected  negati vely  by  the  impact  of  government 
control  of  prices  and  inter-regional  trade.  This 
concentration is supported by government  subsidies to 
producers in  return for agreements to sell  grain  to the state system. The problem has been that contract grain 
prices  controls,  differentials  in  prices  and  taxes 
between  regions  caused  by  the  decentralisation  of 
management to local areas, and the low relative prices 
for contract grains, have created a situation where the 
grain-producing  areas  are  unable  to  generate  a 
reasonable return. The base areas are relatively poor, 
and  peasant incentives are low.  Government revenues 
are  also  therefore  limited.  The  base  areas  are  thus 
constrained in developing a key role in the production 
and marketing system. 
Finally, it should be noted that grain trade in China 
is  also  affected  by  trends  in  the  composition  of 
demand.  Demand  composition  is  changing,  but 
possibly more slowly than the composition of output. 
This  difference  has  led  to  issues  associated  with 
changes in relative prices, for example, the rising price 
of rice in the fIrst half of the 19905. 
International trade 
The rising domestic prices for grain in China in 1994 
and 1995 correspond to the rise in net exports in  that 
period (see Figure 5).  Throughout that period, China 
has been a net importer of wheat. Since the mid-1980s, 
it has been a net exporter of maize. It is approximately 
self-sufficient in rice. The growth in maize exports is 
also  related  to  trends  in  domestic  output  and 
consumption, where in the last few years the growth in 
15  -- Rice 
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domestic demand for maize began to catch up with the 
growth in output. The chart highlights the  growth of 
imports in 1995. 
In  terms  of  grain  trade  liberalisation,  Chinese 
policy makers have been concerned mainly about food 
security  and  incomes  of grain  producers,  especially 
those in relatively poor areas of China (Du Xiaohong 
et a1.1996). 
In their review of the food security issue, Findlay 
and Watson (1996a) examine the data on China's role 
in world wheat and rice trade. They report that import 
share of wheat consumption in  China has fluctuated 
since the late  19805  from a high  of nearly  16%  to a 
low of just over 4%, and that China's share of world 
wheat trade has moved in a similar pattern. Its share of 
world output (net of its own production) has, however, 
not exceeded 4% in this period. On the other hand, the 
world rice market is relatively 'thin', with only a small 
trade  volume  relative  to  output.  China's  position, 
however,  has  swung from  net exports to net imports, 
and at one point (1993-94) its imports accounted for 
nearly  10%  of  world  rice  trade.  However,  the 
importance of its trade in world rice output (net of its 
output) is  small  and the  role of imports in  domestic 
rice  consumption  is  also  smalL  These  sorts  of 
assessments, as well as the likely market responses to 
a rise in Chinese demand, challenge the concern held 
in China, at least at central  government level, about 
5 
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}'igllre 5,  China's net grain exports 1980-95 ('GOOt). 
Source: Customs statistics 
20 the  scope  for  using  the  world  market  for  supply 
security objectives. These issues are discussed in more 
detail in Sections 4 and 5. 
We  now  turn  to  the  question  of how  the  inter-
regional transfers of grain were organised within this 
context.  that  is.  the  to  date  of  the 
developmein of the marketing system, and the impact 
of the intersectoral forces on patterns of trade within 
China.  Our  interest  here  is  the  possibilities  for 
intervention  created  by  the  new  institutional 
arrangements used to manage the internal transactions. 
Local responsibility for grain production 
and marketing 
Inter-regional grain transfers 
Before the reforms in 1993, there was  a dual system 
for the interprovincial grain trade in China: transfer at 
planned  prices  (lower  prices,  planned  transfer)  and 
transfer  at  negotiated  prices  (market  transfer).  The 
provincial governments were basically responsible for 
the supply of grain in  local areas given the following 
two conditions. 
(i)  Each  province  was  given  a  quota  for 
interprovincial  transfer  at  planned  prices.  Grain 
surplus  provinces  usually  had  a  quota  for  the 
outflow of grain from  these provinces at state-set 
prices, and grain-deficit provinces had a quota for 
the  inflow of grain at  statc prices.  Consequently, 
grain-deficit  provinces  (with  grain  inflows) 
benefited from the planned  transfers. 
(ii) After  fulfilling  the  quota  for  planned  grain 
transfers,  provincial governments could purchase 
grain at market or near-market prices from other 
provinces (Almanac of Chinas Commerce,  1992, 
1993). 
This system was not particularly hostile to major 
grain-producing provinces. But these provinces could 
suffer  big  financial  losses,  with  misjudgment.  For 
example, some local governments blocked the markets 
and  purchased  grain  from  producers  at  low  prices. 
Their aim was to speculate on subsequent increases in 
market  grain  prices  in  the  rest  of China.  But  after 
1989,  with  consecutive  bumper  harvests  and  low 
market prices for grain, these provinces faced financial 
problems. 
Compared  with  the  reforms  in  the  planned 
purchases  and  sales  of  grain,  the  reform  to  the 
interprovincial  transfer  of  grain  was  perhaps  less 
visible, but not less significant. Following the reform 
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in 1993, the major grain-producing provinces in China 
were no longer required to transfer their grain to grain-
deficit  provinces  (and  metropolitan  cities)  at  lower-
than-market  prices.  Since  then,  the  interprovincial 
trade has been undertaken mainly at market prices. 
One objective of the reform was to encourage the 
local governments and producers in both grain-deficit 
and  surplus areas to  produce more  grain,  and,  more 
importantly, to make local governments become more 
responsible for the grain supply in  local  areas. Grain 
bureaus  and  local  governments  in  major  grain-
producing  provinces  were  still  able  to  make  profits, 
possibly even marc than  before,  by  procuring locally 
produced grain at  low  prices (using the retained local 
powers of procurement) and selling it to grain-deficit 
areas at market prices (under the new rules applying to 
inter-regional transfers). 
This  local  responsibility  system for grain  supply 
was consistent with the tax reforms in  1994. After the 
separation of the budget revenues and outlays between 
the  central and local governments, local governments 
in  China were required  to  pay for  subsidies in  grain 
production and marketing in local areas. 
At this  time,  the  central  government focused  its 
financial resources on the establishment of risk funds 
to buy grain stocks, to be used in an effort to stabilise 
grain market prices. In fact,  both the central and local 
governments  have  been  required  to  establish  risk 
funds  for  grain  stocks.  Field  work  indicates  that 
according  to  the  central  policy,  local  governments 
have been ordered to contribute  1.5  yuan  counterpart 
funds  for  every  1.0  yuan  contributed  by  the  central 
government. 
A further  financial  change at  this  time  was  that, 
following  the  establishment  of  the  Agricultural 
Development  Bank  of China  (ADBC)  in  1994,  the 
ADBC became responsible for the  supply of finance 
for  planned grain purchases and storage. The central 
government  also  attempted  to  settle  overdue  loans 
from  the grain bureaus to  the financial institutions in 
the early  I 990s. Interest on overdue loans for  policy 
operations by  bureaus was paid  by  the  central 
budget, on the condition that all  the overdue loans be 
paid within five years. 
These  were followed by  the increases in 
grain prices after late 1993 reported above, and which 
caused  great  concern  among  the  central  authorities. 
Also as  noted above, measures were taken to  counter 
the  rise  in  grain  prices,  such  as  the  release  of grain 
stocks  and  regulation  of grain  prices  for  grain  sold through grain bureaus, but none of these measures was 
effective.  Finally,  in  1995,  the provincial  governor's 
responsibility system (PGRS) was  introduced by  the 
central government. 
Provincial governor's responsibility system 
Following the crises in the grain market in  1993  and 
1994,  and  in  the  context  of the  current  fiscal  and 
financial  relations  between  the  Centre  and  the 
provinces,  the  challenge  for  the  Centre  was  how  it 
could accelerate the rate of growth of grain output in 
the Southeast. As discussed earlier, output growth had 
slowed  in  that  region,  which  had  become  a  net 
importer. In that role, it had previously benefited from 
cheap food and materials at state prices  from  inland 
provinces under the old inter-regional transfer system. 
The previous access of this region to  cheap grain, at 
the  same time  its  income rising  rapidly,  had  caused 
much  resentment  from  the  major  grain-producing 
provinces.  Following  the  1993  reforms,  the  inland 
grain  producers  (including  the  Northeast)  had  just 
started to  benefit from  higher prices.  The provincial 
governor's  responsibility  system  made  that  more 
difficult. 
The essence of the PGRS was to make governors 
responsible for  balancing the  supply  of and  demand 
for  grain in  their provinces. That includes stabilising 
sown areas, raising yields, establishing local stocks as 
required,  and  managing  interprovincial  transfers. 
Officials  therefore  stress  that  the  system  means  a 
devolution of responsibility for transfers within China 
to a lower level consistent with the development of the 
grain market. However, the actual focus of the PGRS 
may have been narrower than that. 
A  component  of  the  policy  was  to  ask  local 
governments  in  relatively  richer  and  industrialised 
areas,  where  grain  output  growth  had  slowed  as 
explained  above,  to  subsidise  grain  production  and 
marketing  to  keep  the  price  of grain  lower  in  local 
markets. The policy, according to some analysts, was 
based  on  the  observation that  if prices  in  relatively 
richer Southern China were relatively low and stable, 
then  grain  price  and  supply  would  be  stable  at  the 
national level. This aspect of the policy dealt with the 
centre's  concern  about  higher  prices  in  that  area 
spreading to the rest of China. 
Field work in China revealed that associated with 
the PGRS were a number of other policies also issued 
by the central government in  1995.  In  addition to  50 
mt  of  grain  procurement  at  plan  prices,  local 
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governments  and  grain  bureaus  were  required  to 
purchase 40 mt of grain  at  market prices from grain 
producers.  Moreover,  procured grain  should be  sold 
only to lower-income urban residents, not to all urban 
residents.  The  government,  however,  is  caught in  a 
dilemma, since on the one hand it may want to protect 
grain  producers  in poor provinces,  and on the  other 
hand it  wants  to  supply  grain  to  low-income  urban 
residents  at  relatively  low  grain  prices.  A  more 
targeted policy would help resolve this dilemma,  but 
the legal and institutional framework in China makes 
it difficult for  the government distribution  system to 
reach its target. 
In  1995,  according  to  our  field  work,  grain 
producers  in  Guangdong  were  paid  higher plan  and 
market prices  and  lower taxes  in  order to  encourage 
them to produce grain. For them, however, producing 
grain  was  less  profitable  than  producing  something 
else.  In  contrast,  peasants  in  Jiangxi  received lower 
prices,  paid  higher  taxes  and  had  to  pay  heavy 
transport  levies  to  shift  grain  to  the  Guangdong 
market, where they might have earned a higher profit. 
The barriers to inter-regional trade and the complexity 
of  different  local  prices  and  taxes  were  thus 
undermining the growth of market relationships. 
This  work reveals the  continuing  significance of 
barriers to trade between the provinces. The exporting 
provinces can restrict volumes in  long-distance trade 
through  administrative  controls  or  through  taxes 
applied  in  the  congested transport  infrastructure  (as 
discussed above). Sometimes border barriers are  also 
applied (e.g. road blocks), although these are easier to 
evade. 
Importing  provinces  could  adopt  the  same 
policies,  although  with  greater  difficulty  than 
exporters.  While  exporters  may  use  these  sorts  of 
barriers,  importing-provinces  under  the  PGRS  are 
more  likely  to  apply  subsidies  to  local  producers. 
Furthermore  these  subsidies  are  more  likely  to  be 
related to inputs to grain production. Output subsidies 
could  also  be  exploited  by  local  producers  (e.g.  by 
importing grain from other regions). 
The  likely  attitude  of  the  grain-exporting 
provinces to  the  PGRS  seems  clear.  They  lose  from 
any  policy  which  reduces  their  export  prices,  for 
example, as  a consequence of a drop in demand from 
their previous customers. 
The  high-income  importers  may  not  favour  the 
scheme, either. They are now obliged by the centre to 
follow a strategy which is relatively more costly than that used before,  in  terms  of loss of the  from 
specialisation  and  trade.  The  coastal  provinces  have 
had long experience in internal trade in  and may 
be less  concerned about supply security than  policy-
makers at the Centre. 
Low-income importers, on whom the Centre has 
applied less pressure to meet the targets of the PGRS 
and who were not the focus of its implementation, may 
gain  from  lower  domestic  market  priees  than 
otherwise for the protected grains. 
One  hypothesis  is  that  the  PGRS  signals 
institutional arrangements for a major turning point in 
agricultural  policy  in  China toward more protection. 
However,  the  domestic  politieal  forces  in  that 
direction, observed in other East Asian economies, are 
not so  strong  in  China at  this  stage.  Farmer groups 
have yet to become the strong political force they are 
elsewhere. Field work experience, and the observation 
of the  growth  of the  TVE  sector  in  rural  China, 
indicate that alternative employment opportunities are 
many  and  nearby.  Costs of adjustment  are  therefore 
smaller. And as  some scholars are now stressing (e.g. 
Lu  Feng.  1  996a),  farmers  also  have  alternative 
competitive uses of their land,  for example, for fruit 
and vegetable production. This offsets concerns of the 
effects of structural change in  agriculture on incomes 
of  households  which  lack  the  mobility  to  seek 
employment  outside  agriculture.  Lu's  work  is 
reviewed in more detail in Section 5. 
At  this  point,  it  is  important  to  clarify  the 
management of international trade in grain under this 
new policy. The central government continues to set a 
quota on grain imports. This is done in  advance of the 
period to which the quota applies. The assessment is 
based on prices at the time the assessment is made and 
on projections of prices over the period of the imports. 
The bulk of this quota is retained at central level (e.g. 
15  mt  in  1995).  Some  is  passed  to  provincial  levels 
5 mt) and some retained by trading companies to 
supply  grain  to  the  processing  sector (e.g.  1.5  mt). 
Quotas  allocated  to  provincial  levels  can  be 
transferred. Provincial level governments can use that 
quota  if they  have  the  foreign  exehange  required. 
Otherwise  they  must  petition  the  Centre  for  an 
allocation  from  the  central  quota.  These  quantitative 
constraints on imports  mean  that  domestic  prices  in 
China can  move  away  from  world  prices,  although 
depending  on  the  management  of  the  quota  that 
divergence might be corrected in later periods. 
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Local budget issues 
The implementation of the new system in the middle 
1990s  has  led  to  some  interesting  developments  in 
terms of subsidies in  production and marketing 
in China's coastal provinces. 
First, due to variations in the opportunity cost for 
grain production within a province, it is difficult for a 
province to  set a uniform  subsidy  level  for  all  grain 
producers in  the province. Consequently, all levels of 
administration, from the province to the prefecture and 
county governments, are required to give subsidies for 
grain  production  in  the  local  area.  The  township 
governments  and  village  administrations  are  also 
required  to  subsidise  grain  production  with  their 
profits  from  TVEs.  The  first  implication  of  this 
development  is  that  idcntifying  the  extent  of  the 
subsidies  paid  is  difficult because  of the  number of 
levels of government involved. 
As the richer areas have more economic resources, 
and as opportunity costs for grain production in richer 
areas  are  higher,  the  system  tends  to  result  in  the 
situation  where  the  level  of grain  subsidy  becomes 
positively correlated with the level of local incomes. 
Second,  some  local  governments  have  tried  to 
shift the  burden, or part of the burden, to  individual 
farm households by forcing them to grow more 
This  is  done  by  setting  the  sown  area  for  grain 
production (with heavy penalties for  not complying), 
To  some extent, then.  the  application of these quotas 
means  shifting the  burden  of subsidising production 
from  local  governments  to  the  farmers  themselves. 
These households have to produce grain at high cost, 
or buy  grain  from  the  markets,  using  incomes  from 
elsewhere.  But  the  PGRS,  to  its  credit,  actually 
explicitly precludes the  use of administrative means, 
application  of which  is  bound  to  cause  significant 
farmer resentment and reaction. So the application of 
administrative  means  at  farm  level  is  strictly  not 
consistent with the policy. 
Of the richer southeast coastal provinces, Jiangsu 
is  the  one  which  has  maintained  self-sufficiency  in 
grain after the  second stage of grain market reforms. 
The basic self-sufficiency in grain production has been 
maintained  by  huge  inputs  from  local  governments, 
especially  those in  the  more developed  areas  of the 
province. From 1978 to 1993, about 9 billion yuan was 
transferred  from  TVEs  to  agricultural  production  in 
the province, mainly to  grain production.  year, 
the province spends about  100 billion  yuan subsidies 
on agriculture, using the profits from  TVEs and local budget  outlays.  These  funds  have  been  invested 
mainly  in  the  12 counties of the three prefectures in 
southern  Jiangsu  Province,  where  the  comparative 
advantage  for  grain  production  declined  the  fastest 
(Lin Chenguang 1996). 
Changes in  domestic marketing since the middle 
1990s have  important implications for  China's grain 
trade.  Some  numerical  assessments  are  offered  in 
Section 4. 
Increases in output in richer grain-deficit areas and 
the  possible decline in  output in  major grain-surplus 
areas (a consequence of any price effect) mean that the 
volume of domestic trade could be reduced. However, 
establishing the pattern of this change requires further 
empirical work,  since the mix of crops differs among 
these  regions.  The  main  impact  in  the  short  run, 
however, is likely to be in markets for rice, the output 
of  which  is  subsidised  by  southern  provincial 
governments.  There  may  be  some  effects  on  wheat 
output, as a consequence of substitution on the supply 
side in rice-growing areas, although that also depends 
on the assistance provided to wheat production. 
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The effects on maize output are uncertain but less 
likely to be significant. The introduction of the PGRS 
coincided  with  a  ban  on  maize  exports.  The  maize 
crop  in  1996  has  grown  substantially,  but  transport 
constraints mean that it is very difficult to transfer the 
grain  southwards  to  the large meat production  areas 
where it is  needed.  Governors  in  the  South face  the 
choice  between  importing  or  buying  from  the 
Northeast in order to balance local supplies. 
These developments depend not only on changes 
in  marketing  arrangements,  but  also  on  trends  in 
demand and  supply.  Changes in  demand for grain in 
China are outlined in  more detail in the next section, 
followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  scope  to  raise 
productivity growth in the grain sector. 2. Grain Demands 
There is a wide range of projections of grain demand 
in China. Among the studies in China, Huang Yanxin 
(from the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing) reports a 
set  of projections  of the  change  in  grain  demand 
between 1994 and the year 2000 (Huang 1995). Huang 
assumes a relatively low annual growth rate of grain 
demand (of the order of one per cent a year), leading to 
consumption in the year 2000 of just over 500 mt.  A 
feature of his analysis is the relatively slow growth of 
feed grain demand. In fact, the share of feed grains in 
total  consumption falls in his projection, This result is 
partly  a consequence of Huang's  assumption of the 
growth  in  grain  yields  in  the  feed  sector  over  the 
period. While the projection is an outlier compared to 
those  developed  outside  China  (see  Section  4),  it 
illustrates a key expectation of one part of the official 
system in Beijing. 
On  the  other  hand,  Mei  Fangquan  (from  the 
Chinese  Academy  of Agricultural  Sciences)  argues 
that direct grain consumption will  fall from a high of 
251 kg per head in 1984 to less than 215 kg in the year 
2000 (lower than Huang's estimate of 220 kg per head 
in the year 2000) and about 180 kg per head in the year 
2010 (Mei  1995).  Mei focuses  on the  change in  the 
structure of demand as  income grows,  and as  direct 
consumption  of  falls.  Overall,  however,  grain 
consumption continues to increase in this  projection. 
Mei  expects  that  total  consumption  will  rise 
from 520 mt in the year 2000 (or 400 kg per head per 
year) to 600 mt in 20 I 0 (or 420 kg per head). 
Factors affecting China's demand for 
grain 
There  are  many  factors  determining both individual 
and  national  grain  consumptiou.  Dcterminants  of 
individual  demand include:  (i)  income - consumers 
BThis part is an edited and shortened version of Wu and Findlay 
(1996), 
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tend  to  spend  an  increasing proportion of additional 
income  upon  luxury  foodstuffs  meat)  and  a 
decreasing proportion of it on  staple foodstuffs  (e.g. 
rice); (ii) prices  utility-maximising cOllsumers tend 
to  consume  less  of one  food  item  and  shift  to  its 
substitutes  when  its  price  rises  or  the  prices  of its 
substitutes fall;  and  (iii) dietary habits  consumers 
are  generally and strongly inf1uenced  by  culture and 
religion  or  belief.  though  their  dietary  habits  do 
change when their lifestyle changes (e.g. from rural to 
urban, or from traditional to modem life styles). 
Determinants  of aggregate  dcmand  include:  (i) 
population, which is not only a quantitative factor that 
can  be  simply  multiplied  by  per  capita  grain 
consumption to get total  demand for  but also a 
qualitative  factor  that  affects  both  quantity  and 
structure of demand for grain through the changes in 
age  structure,  gender  ratio  and  mral-to-urban 
migration; (ii) feeding  determining the use 
of feed  grain  for  producing  meat;  (iii)  efficiency of 
industrial use of grain,  determining the  use  of grain 
for  producing  grain-based  industrial  products  (e.g. 
grain liquor, medicine); (iv)  seed use,  determined by 
choices made in seed brceding, selection and sowing; 
(v)  waste,  determined  by  the  way  in  which  grain  is 
shipped,  stored,  processed  and  consumed;  and  (vi) 
grain  stocks,  largely  determined  by  government 
policy. Changes in  these factors determine changes in 
total demand for grain. 
As  discussed  below,  the  large  variation  in 
projections of China's demand for  grain  (Table  1)  is 
due  to  the  enormous  differences  in:  (i)  research 
findings  on  income  and  price  effects  from  demand 
function studies for China, and (ii) assumptions about 
exogcnous factors. Furthermore, most studies reported 
in Table I do not consider fully the effect of changing 
dietary  habits  and  the  effect of changing population 
structure. Food grain 
The estimated income elasticities of demand for food 
grain vary from about negative 0.2 to positive 0.6, and 
estimated own-price elasticities of demand vary from 
about negative 0.1  to  negative  1.5,  regardless of the 
residence ,of  the  population.  Wu  and  Wu  (1994) 
provide much more detailed estimates by  three major 
food  grains  with  breakdown  of  rural  and  urban 
population and of urban areas by  city size. They have 
found  that  rural  household  consumption  of all  the 
three  food  responds  little  to  income  change. 
Their  tlnding  is  very  close  to  that  of Huang  and 
Rozelle (l995b) for  total  food  Different city 
groups  show different income elasticities of demand 
for  grains,  a  strong  urbanisation  effect. 
Household response to income ehange in demand for 
rice  and  coarse  grain  is  less  in  larger cities  than  in 
smaller cities, while for flour the result is the opposite. 
Wu and Wu's findings (1994) on own-price elasticities 
of demand for  food  grain are generally  greater than 
those  in  all  other  studies.  Largely  due  to  data 
problems, estimates of cross-price elasticities are not 
yet available. 
Almost all  studies have  suggested that at  current 
income  levels,  food  grain  demand continues  to  rise 
with  income  in  China.  Grain consumption  generally 
rises while income increases. However, by estimating 
a regional demand function, Wu  and Wu  (1994) have 
found  that  food  especially  rice  and  coarse 
grains, tend to  be  'inferior goods'  in  the high-income 
southern  and  Yangtze  River regions.  Using  his  own 
survey data on consumption of different rice varieties, 
Huang J.  (1994)  has  also  found  that indica rice  has 
become an  'inferior good'  even to  rural  households 
with higher income. 
Wu  and  WU'g  study  (1994)  paid  particular 
attention to  the  effect of urbanisation on  demand for 
The  income  elasticity  increases  from  smaller 
cities to larger ones, which implies that urban lifestyle 
does play a role. They argue that demand for flour will 
be the main source of growth in grain consumption in 
cities,  and  it  will  increase  as  the  urbanisation  level 
increases. 
Huang and David (1993) stress the direct effects of 
the expected increase  in  the  rate of urbanisation  on 
cereal  demand.  What  they  call  'the level  of market 
development'  has  an  important effect on patterns. In 
rural  areas,  where markets are not developed.  where 
there is  a relatively low rate of access to refrigeration 
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and where there are high transactions costs for buying 
processed  products,  consumption  patterns  remain 
relatively  more  concentrated  on  direct  grain 
consumption. In urban areas, the availability of these 
services and the lower transactions costs lead to lower 
relative prices for processed products at the household 
level and  a relatively greater rate of consumption  of 
those products (for given incomes and market prices). 
This  pattern  will  change  even  in  households  which 
continue  to  live  in  rural  locations,  as  the  marketing 
infrastructure develops, but the process of urbanisation 
accelerates the change. 
MeaUfeed grain 
As  in  the  case  of food  grain, estimated income  and 
price e1asticities of demand for grain-based foodstuffs 
also  differ  significantly.  For  example,  the  income 
elasticitv of demand for beef and mutton ranges from 
0.32  to'1.23,  for  pork  from  0.57  to  1.02,  and  for 
pOUltry  from  0.72 to  1.95,  regardless of the  place of 
residence  of the  popUlation..  There  are  not  many 
estimates available of the price elasticity of demand. 
Wu  and Wu  (1994)  have found  that  demand  for 
grain-based  foodstuffs  like  meat,  eggs,  fish  and 
alcohol  is  much  more  income-elastic  in  rural  areas 
than  in  cities.  They  argue  that this  may  be  because 
these foodstuffs are more likely to be lUXUry  in 
rural areas and the current consumption level of these 
goods in the rural area is much lower than that of the 
urban area. 
Dietary habits 
A clear effect of dietary habits on food  consumption 
due  to  different  cultural  backgrounds  has  been 
observed. In  the  regions (south and southwest of the 
Yangtze River) that are considered to have maintained 
the  Han  Chinese  'dietary  cultural'  much 
more pork is consumed than in the  (north and 
west of the Yangtze) that are considered to have been 
more  or  less  influenced  by  non-Chinese  'dietary 
cultures'  (Mongolian,  Manchurian,  Tibetan  and 
Moslem),  where  more  ruminant  meat  is  consumed 
(Figure 6).  When shifting from  a smaller to  a larger 
city  group  all  meat  consumption  increases  except 
ruminant  meat,  which  stays  almost  unchanged.  In 
alcohol consumption, more beer but less Chinese grain 
liquor  is  consumed  in  cities  than  in  smaller 
cities or towns where the traditional cultural influence 
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Figure 6.  China·s per capita food grain (Kg) and grain-based food consumption, 1991. 
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•  Grain  o  Coarse 
•  Wheat  o  Rice 
Other fine 
•  Pork  D  Ruminant 
•  Poultry 
D  Aquatic  o  Alcohol 
•  Grain  D  Coarse 
•  Wheat  D  Rice 
Other fine 
•  Pork  D  Ruminant 
•  Poultry  D  Aquatic 
Alcohol Population effect 
The  population  growth  rates  applied  by  vanous 
projections  are  different.  One  half of a  percentage 
point in  a large country like China could result in  an 
.  .  9  enormous gap in grain demand between proJections. 
Studies sh_ow that there has been no careful calculation 
of actual population growth rate for the first half of the 
1990s.  In  1990-95  the  actual  population  grew  at 
1.16% a year,  compared with  different rates used by 
various  projections  for  the  1990s,  ranging  from  1.3 
(Garnaut and Ma 1992), 1.28 (Lin, Huang and Rozelle 
1996) to  1.45-1.48 (OECF 1995). 
Given  per  capita  grain  consumption,  the  most 
important  factor  for  a  simple  projection  of  total 
consumption is  a reasonable population growth rate. 
Considering  the  effect  on  population  growth  of 
changes  in  age  structure,  gender  ratio,  fertility  and 
mortality  rates  over  time  and  across  various  age 
groups, life-table modelling is the most reliable way to 
estimate population growth over a projection period. 
Using  this  technique  with  basic  vital  statistics 
available  from  China's  1990 population census  data 
(PCO  and  DPS  1993,  Vols  2  and  3),  China's 
popUlation  growth  from  1995  to  2030  is  estimated 
(Table  2).  While the  results  provide a more realistic 
population  growth  in  the  next  35  years,  they  also 
highlight the change in the age distribution in each of 
the sub-periods. It appears that China's population will 
grow by  1.33% a year before it slows down after the 
year  2000  and  reaches  1.43  billion  by  2010,  1.53 
billion by 2020, and 1.60 billion by 2030. 
There has also been a lack of study of the impact 
of changes in the age structure on demand for grain. 
For example, other things being equal, a decline in the 
number of people in  early adulthood will  result in  a 
decline  in  per capita food  consumption.  In  addition, 
with differences  in  fertility  between urban  and rural 
areas,  and with labour migration from rural  to  urban 
areas, changes in the age structure will have an impact 
on food consumption, especially in the long run.  Our 
population projection (Table 2) shows that China will 
experience a  'popUlation transition'  over the next 35 
9In Lin, Huang J.  and Rozelle's baseline scenario, annual popUlation 
growth rate is 0.74% for the period 2000-2010. compared with 
1.25% (2000-2005) and 1.19% (2005-20 I 0) used by Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan) (OECF). The gap between the 
two projections means 67 million more population (assume the  . 
population grows from a simply projected populatIOn of 1.28 bllhon 
in 2000 based on the actual growth rate of I .16% in  1990-95) and, on 
a basis of 400 kg grain per capita per year. 27 mt (million metric ton) 
more grain consumption in 2010, four times the annual net grain 
import of 6.4 mt of 1978-95. 
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years which will significantly affect popUlation growth 
via  changes  in  age  structure.  During  the  period 
1995-2030 there will be a decline in the proportion of 
the population aged below 30 from 54% to 41 %, and a 
rise in the proportion of the  population aged 45  and 
above from 23% to  39%, while an almost unchanged 
share remains of those aged 30-44. 
Feeding efficiency 
Garnaut and Ma's study  (1992)  gives  a good list of 
available estimates of the feed-meat conversion ratio 
by  summarising  six  different  studies  by  Chinese 
researchers in  1988-91. Table 3 updates that list. All 
these estimates differ greatly, ranging from 4: 1 to 7: 1 
for pork (i.e.  4 kg to  7 kg feedgrain to  produce  1 kg 
pork), 2: I to 4.8: I for beef and mutton, 2: I to 3.8: I for 
poultry, 2.5: I to 3.5: I for eggs, 0.33: I to  3: I for milk, 
and 1: 1 to 2: 1 for fish. Clearly, pork is the most 'grain-
intensive'  meat product,  and  milk and  fish  are  least 
'grain-intensive'.  Different  ratios  are  reported  in 
recent studies, e.g. 3:1  for fish  by Jiang et al.  (1996), 
and 7: 1 for beef by  Du et al.  (1995). However, there 
has  been  no  serious  research  in  this  area  using  a 
quantitative  approach  (e.g.  a  cost  function  or 
production function  analysis).  As  shown later in our 
new  estimate of implied feed consumption in China, 
results vary considerably if different ratios are used. 
Seed input 
There  have  been  few  studies  of seed  consumption, 
especially the relationship between seed input quantity 
and  seed quality,  price and yield.  In  some provinces 
(e.g. Shandong), the promotion of a 'precision seeding 
technique'  tends  to  reduce  seed  input.  It,  however, 
relies  heavily  on  the  quality  of  seeds  (i.e.  seed 
emergence  rate)  which  is  determined  not  only  by 
selection and breeding but also by research. lO 
The  1995  farm household survey by the Chinese 
Economy  Research  Unit  and  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture  (hereafter CERU-MoA survey)  suggests 
that  on  average,  seed  input  per  mu 11  varied 
considerably among crops (10 kg for winter wheat, 2.1 
kg  for  middle-late  indica rice  and  3.4  kg  for  corn) 
(Table 4). Seed consumption also varies greatly across 
households. For example, the maximum seed input per 
mu  for  winter wheat was  1.7  times  the  average,  for 
middle-late indica rice 6.6 times the average, and for 
'<Trhis loss is different from that in sowing which is affected by 
whether seeding or drilling is used. As will be discussed later, China 
is reported to have an enormous sowing grain loss of 8.4 mt per year. 
J1 Mu is a unit of are a measurement in China: 15 mu = I ha. Table 2.  Projected population and the share of  age groups in China to 2030 
1995  2000  2010  2020  2030 
Population (billion)  1.2281  1.3121  1.4321  1.5335  1.5988 
Within-period annual growth (%)  1.332  0.879  0.686  0.419 
Share of age group (%) 
0-14  - 27.0  26.2  23.3  21.4  20.5 
15-29  26.7  23.5  22.7  2004  20.1 
30-44  23.0  24.0  22.4  20.7  20.5 
45-59  13.5  15.5  18.8  20.9  18.0 
60 and over  9.8  10.8  12.9  16.5  21.0 
Source: Authors' own  using Life-Table modelling technique. Basic data are from SSB (1996, pp. 74-78) and peo and DPS (1993, 
Vol. 2, pp. 2-3); Vol.  pp. 539-541). 
Table 3.  China's efficiency of use of  feed grain in the 1990s. 
Source  Pork  Beef and mutton 
Yu (1991)  5.1  3.0 
Food Study Group 
(1991. vol. 5)  5.5-6.4  4.8 
Gao (1990)  6.0-7.0  3.3 
MoA (1988)  5.8 
MoA (1991)  4.0-4.5  2.0 
Food Study Group 
(l991, vol. 2)  4.0  3.4 
Jia (1996)  3.5-4.0 
Yang (1996)  3.0-3.3 
OECF (1995)  4.5  4.5 
Average  4.6  3.9 
Maximum  7.0  7.0 
Minimum  3.5  2.0 
Note: Maximum and miuimum values excludes targeted ratios for future. 
corn 7.5  times  the  average.  There  are  also  regional 
variations. According to  thcse survey rcsults, there is 
great potential for China to reduce seed consumption. 
Waste of grain 
Some studies show that China has been suffering from 
a severe waste of grain at various stages of production, 
handling and marketing, and consumption. The data in 
Table 5 suggest great potential for China to reduce this 
grain loss. But these data are not reliable. There is  an 
enormous  gap  between  official  and  non-official 
estimates in  losses, ranging 50-100 mt for the 
former and  8-11  mt for the latter,  using  1993  as  an 
indicator. While non-official estimates may appear to 
be too high, the official estimates are too low and lack 
detail. Non-official estimates are much higher than the 
international  standard.  For  example,  the  loss  from 
sowing, harvesting, shipping and stockpiling as quoted 
Poultry  Eggs  Milk  Fish 
3.0  2.8-3.0  0.3  2.0 
2.5-3.8  3,0-3.5  3,0 
2.0  1.5 
3.0  3.0-3.5  1.0  1.5 
2.5  2.0 
2.5  2.5  0.3  1.0 
2.0-2.2 
1.9-2.1  2.2-2.4  1.6-1.8 
2.7  2.7  0.3  0.8 
2.4  2.9  1.2  1.8 
3.8  3.5  3.0  3.0 
2.0  2.5  0.3  1.0 
by Huang S. (1995) was 58.1 mt, or 13% of total grain 
output of 1993,  which is  much  than the FAO 
standard of 5%.  Obviously,  including or excluding a 
possible grain loss in projecting demand for grain will 
make a significant difference to China's grain balance, 
because a  loss  of 50 mt a year is almost eight times 
China's annual grain net import (6.3 mt) in  1978-95. 
A new estimate of current food and feed 
grain consumption in China to 1995 
Based  on  Wu  and  Wu  (1994)  and  newly  released 
official data (updated to 1995), and taking into account 
alternative feeding efficiency provided by Table 3, we 
have estimated per  food and implied feed grain 
consumption  for  both  urban  and  rural  households 
(Table  8).  All  assumptions  used  in  the  estimation, 
including those  for  low  and high  feeding  efficiency 
scenarios, are reported in the notes to Table 6. 
29 Table 4.  Seed use rates, 1995. 
Crop and province  Sample size  Seed input per mu (kg)  Seed-output ratio (kg/ton) 
Av.  Max.  Min.  Av.  Max.  Min. 
Winter wheat 
Sichuan  195  10.6  17.0  1.0  41.8  97.2  4.3 
(0.26)  (0.45) 
Shandong  203  9.48  16.7  1.1  26.3  86.8  2.9 
(0.27)  (0.50) 
Total samples  398  10.0  17.0  1.0  33.9  97.2  2.9 
(0.26)  (0.45) 
Middle-late iruiica 
Guangdong  204  2.4  7.0  0.5  7.0  23.5  0.9 
(0.70)  (0.80) 
Jiangxi  198  1.8  14.1  0.5  4.7  35.2  1.2 
(1.10)  (1.08) 
Sichuan  129  2.3  10.3  0.5  4.4  20.0  1.1 
(1.19)  (1.13) 
Total samples  531  2.14  14.1  0.5  5.5  35.2  0.9 
(0.98)  (0.98) 
Com 
Jilin  185  3.4  8.3  1.6  6.3  30.0  3.0 
(0.34)  (0.42) 
Sichuan  141  2.8  25.0  0.4  9.5  62.5  1.4 
(0.88)  (0.66) 
Shandong  200  3.4  25.0  1.3  10.0  62.5  3.3 
(0.83)  (0.75) 
Total samples*'  544  3.4  25.0  0.4  9.1  62.5  1.4 
(0.73)  (0.79) 
Source: Wu (1996). 
Note: *  18 Guangdong samples are included. Figure in parentheses is coefficient of variation of samples 










































RDI and RSEST  Quoted by Garnaut 
(1996)  and Ma (1992) 
11.1  8.0 Table 6.  China's urban and rural per capita food consumption and implied (unmilled) grain consumption, 1981-95 (Kg). 
Total  Implied feed grain 
High GM  Low GM  Food  High GM  Low GM  Red  Aquatic 
ratio  ratio  grain  ratio  ratio  meat  Poultry  Eggs  products  Alcohol 
....... _--
Urban 
1981  '371.6  335.6  196.1  166.2  130.1  18.6  1.9  5.2  7.3  4.4 
1982  375.5  338.5  194.9  171.1  134.1  18.7  2.3  5.9  7.7  4.5 
1983  391.0  351.2  194.8  184.8  145.0  19.9  2.6  6.9  8.1  5.3 
1984  393.9  353.6  191.6  187.9  147.6  19.9  2.9  7.6  7.8  6.8 
1985  379.7  340.6  181.7  181.4  142.4  19.3  3.2  6.8  7.1  7.8 
1986  407.5  363.9  185.9  201.7  158.1  21.6  3.7  7.1  8.2  9.4 
1987  401.7  358.4  180.5  200.1  156.8  21.9  3.4  6.6  7.9  9.9 
1988  392.3  351.9  185.0  187.3  146.9  19.8  4.0  6.9  7.1  9.5 
1989  390.9  349.7  180.6  191.1  149.9  20.3  3.7  7.1  7.6  9.0 
1990  394.7  351.2  176.3  198.8  155.3  21.7  3.4  7.3  7.7  9.3 
1991  401.9  356.2  172.5  209.7  164.0  22.2  4.4  8.3  S.O  9.3 
1992  382.8  337.0  150.4  211.6  165.7  21.4  5.1  9.5  8.2  9.9 
1993  352.3  309.!  132.1  199.6  156.4  20.8  3.7  8.9  8.0  9.7 
1994  359.8  316.4  137.1  201.5  158.0  20.2  4.1  9.7  8.5  10.0 
1995  350.7  307.9  130.8  198.8  156.0  19.7  4.0  9.7  9.2  9.9 
Rural 
1981  332.7  317.7  256.0  69.6  54.6  8.7  0.7  1.3  1.3  2.3 
1982  341.3  325.6  260.0  73.0  57.3  9.1  0.8  lA  1.3  2.7 
1983  350.2  332.9  260.0  80.4  63.1  10.0  0.8  1.6  1.6  3.2 
1984  364.3  345.7  267.0  86.7  68.0  10.6  0.9  1.8  1.7  3.5 
1985  360.3  341.1  257.0  90.0  70.7  11.0  1.0  2.1  1.6  4A 
1986  370.8  350.0  259.0  96.6  75.8  11.8  1.1  2.1  1.9  5.0 
1987  372.2  351.5  259.0  96.4  75.8  11.7  1.2  2.3  2.0  5.5 
1988  368.5  349.2  260.0  90.3  71.0  10.7  l.3  2.3  1.9  5.9 
1989  373.5  353.5  262.0  93.3  73.3  11.0  1.3  2.4  2.1  6.0 
1990  376.5  356.0  262.1  95.6  75.1  11.3  1.3  2.4  2.1  6.1 
1991  377.9  354.5  255.6  102.8  79.4  12.2  1.3  2.7  2.2  6.4 
1992  372.2  349.2  250.5  101.6  78.6  11.8  1.5  2.9  2.3  6.6 
1993  387.7  364.6  266.0  101.7  78.6  11.7  1.6  2.9  2.5  6.5 
1994  377.0  354.8  260.6  97.9  75.8  11.0  1.6  3.0  2.7  6.0 
1995  381.1  358.0  258.9  102.1  79.1  11.3  1.8  3.2  3.1  6.5 
Sources; SSB, Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues. Calculations apply, see notes below. 
Notes; 
(1) The published food grain data for urban households are 'processed  . They are converted back to 'unmilled grain', as used for rural 
households, based on a ratio of 0.7416 quoted in Garnaut and Ma 
(2) The conversion ratio for animal product is the median value from various estimates provided by Gal11aut and Ma (!  992, Table 30). For the 
high grain-meat conversion ratio (GM ratio) 7; 1 for pork, 4.8;1  for beef/mutton, 3.8;1  for poultry, 3.5:1  for egg, and 2; I for fish, For the low GM 
conversion ratio, the corresponding figures are 5.5; I (pork). 3.2; I (beef/mutton), 2,9; I (poultry), 3; I (eggs) and 1.5: I (fish). Since some estimates 
use 'unmilled grain' and some use 'fine feed grain', the estimates here may be somewhere in between. bur closer to 'unmillcd grain', 
(3) For urban households. we assume that 10% of red meat is beef and mutton in the I 980s and 15% in the 1990s (based on SSB survey, SSB 
1995, p,  263). and for ruml households the corresponding values are 5% and 10%. 
(4) The conveThion ratio for alcohol drinks is 4; 1 for grain liquor and (},25:1  for heer (Wu and Wu  1994, Table 2). It  is assumed that 25% of 
alcohol consumption is beer for rural households, and 50% for urban households. 
31 There are two important points to be  noted from 
the  new  estimates.  Firstly,  while  annual  urban  per 
capita food  grain consumption declined rapidly from 
more  than  190  kg  in 1981  to  about  130 kg  in  1995, 
rural per capita food grain consumption stayed almost 
unchange9  at  about  260  kg,  although  meat 
consumption  for  both  urban  and  rural  households 
increased  rapidly.  This  may  be  because:  (i)  rural 
household meat consumption level  is only half that of 
the  urban,  and  rural  households  may  not  consume 
much  of  other  (non-grain  based)  foodstuffs 
(vegetables,  fruits,  etc.);  (ii)  rural  home-processed 
grain  tends  to  have  a lower conversion  ratio;l2  (iii) 
food  and meat consumed by  urban  households 
outside  home  (e.g.  at  a  restaurant)  may  have  been 
underreported by SSB. 
Secondly,  while  meat  consumption increased for 
both urban and rural households, the annual urban per 
capita consumption of feed  grain peaked  in  1986 at 
about 200 kg, and the rural per capita consumption of 
feed grain was steady after 1991 at about 100 kg. This 
may  be due to  a shift from red  meat to  white meat, 
which saves feed grain. One hypothesis is that the cost 
of grain feed-intensive meat (red meat) has risen more 
rapidly than that of the white meat, which has driven 
the  shift. 13  Further research into this  phenomenon is 
certainly deserved. 
A projection of grain demand to 2020 
This section conducts a projection for demand for food 
and implied feed  in both urban and rural China. 
This projection takes into account particularly: (i) the 
effect of changes in the age on grain consumption; and 
(H)  changes  in  feeding  efficiency.  The  income 
elasticity  of demand  for  food  and  feed  grains  is 
derived here from the simple relationship between per 
capita  real  income  and  food/(implied)feed 
consumption  for  urban  and  rural  households 
(discussion earlier). 
Assumptions 
•  Values  assumed  for  the  income  elasticity  of 
demand for grain are reported in Table 7. 
12See Table 6, Note (I), for the ratio of milled to unmilled grain. 
13This is somewhat  by the retail price movement of 
from January to December of 
1994 in agricultural product fares  cities, the price index 
(January= I  00) for pork is  162, beef 151, sea fish (one sample) 112, 
clear-water fish (one sample) 124, chicken 120 and eggs 107, 
compared to japonica lice, 179, and flour 136 (Editorial Committee 
of PYC 1995. p. 305). 
32 
Thble7.  Assumed income elasticities of demand. 
Urban households  Rural households 
Food  Feed  Food  Feed 
grain  grain  grain  grain 
1995-2000  -0.40  0.30  -0.10  0.50 
2000-2010  -0.30  0.25  -0.30  0.45 
2010-2020  -0.20  0.20  -0.50  0.40 
--~  ..... 
Estimated  grain consumption  levels  for  different 
age  groups  for  1995  are  based  on  per  capita 
consumption  data  from  Table  6,  adding  a  5% 
margin  to  obtain a  upper  bound  projection,  and 
reported in Table 8. 
The  age-adjusted  consumption  level  for  1995  is 
used as  the starting point of per capita food  and 
(implied)  feed  grain  consumption  in  this 
projection. 
Population  levels  and  age  group  shares  at  each 
endpoint  of the  projection  range  are  reported  in 
Table 2.  They are also included in  Table 9 which 
presents the projection results. 
The  change  in  the  urbanisation  rate  over  the 
projected period 1995-2020 is estimated based on 
the change of 1.92%  a  year over  1990-95.  The 
assumed end-period urbanisation levels are given 
in Table 9. 
China's real GDP growth is assumed 8% a year for 
Scenario  I  and  10%  a  year  for  Scenario  H.  Per 
capita income growth is calculated based on total 
GDP  growth  and  population  growth  (Table  4). 
Real  income growth of 10% a year is unrealistic, 
but used as a comparison with the growth scenario 
of8% a year. 
The projection results are reported in Table 9.  Key 
points are the following. 
This  projection  of  China's  demand  for  grain 
appears to be lie within most studies made outside 
China - e.g.  with an  income growth rate of 8% 
and in the low feeding efficiency scenario, China's 
demand for total  grain  will  be  523  mt  a year by 
2000, 585 mt a year by 2010 and 643 mt a year by 
2020. 
•  The results show that demand for feed grain  will 
be  the only  major driving force  in  the growth of 
demand  for  grain  in  China  from  the  year  2000 
onwards. 
The  combined  effects  of  income  growth  and 
change in population structure will lead to a fall in 
the demand for food grain. Table 8.  Assumed per capita grain consumption by age group. 
Adjustment  Urban households  Rural households 
as % of the average  Food grain  Feed grain  Food grain  Feed grain 
(kg/person)  (kg/person)  (kg/person)  (kg/person) 
Average in 1.:able 8 
I 86.()h1230.91  104.1 h/128.31  (up by 5%)  137.3  271.8 
0-14  70  96.0  J30.()IV161AI  190.1  72.7h/89.71 
15-44  120  164.6  222.8hI276.71  325.8  124.7h/153.81 
45-59  100  137.2  185.7hI230.61  271.5  103.9h/128.21 
60+  80  109.8  148.611/184.51  217.2  83.1h/102.6! 
New average  137.2  185.7h/230.61  271.5  103.9h/128.2! 
Note:  'h' denotes high feeding efficiency (Le. low grain to meat conversion ratio). and '1' denotes low feeding efficiency (high grainmeat 
conversion ratio). 
The pace of the increase in demand for feed grain 
and the decline in  demand for food grain will be 
very sensitive to the rate of income growth. 
A  change  in  feeding  efficiency  will  make  a 
significant difference to  China's demand for feed 
grain. 
33 Table 9.  Projections of  China's demand for food and feed grains for 2000, 2010 and 2020 under different income growth 
and feed grain use efficiency scenarios. 
Scenario I: 8% p.a. GDP growth  Scenario II: 10% p.a. GDP growth 
1995  2000  2010  2020  2000  2010  2020 
A. End-of-period population (billion)  1.2281  1.3121  1.4321  1.5335  1.3121  1.4321  1.5335 
I. Share of total by age group (%) 
0-14  27.0  26.2  23,3  21.4  26.2  23.3  21.4 
15-44  49.7  47.5  45,1  41.1  47.5  45.1  4Ll 
45-59  13.5  15,5  18,8  20.9  15,5  18.8  20,9 
60+  9.8  10.8  12.9  16.5  10.8  12.9  16.5 
2. Share of total by residence (%) 
Urban  29.0  32.0  39.0  47.0  32.0  39.0  47.0 
Rural  71.0  68.0  61.0  53.0  68.0  61.0  53.0 
B. Within-period income growth 
Total GDP growth (%)  n.a.  8.0  8.0  8.0  10.0  10.0  10.0 
Pcr capita GDP growth (%)  n.a.  6.3  7.1  7.3  8.3  9.0  9.5 
C. End-of-period demand for grain* 
1.  Food grain 
Urban: Per capita (kg)  137.18  120.26  97.06  83.05  115.41  87.64  72.02 
Total demand (mt)  48.85  50.49  54.21  59.86  48.46  48.95  51.91 
Rural: Per capita (kg)  271.52  262.04  211.49  144.71  259.41  197.00  121.51 
Total demand (mt)  236.76  233.79  184,75  117.62  231.45  172.09  98.76 
Total food grain demand (mt)  285.61  284.29  238.96  177.48  279.90  221.04  150.67 
2. Feed grain 
(a) Low feeding efficiency 
Urban: Per capita (kg)  230.62  252.26  300.41  343.66  259.77  324.74  386.33 
Total demand (nH)  82.14  105.91  167.78  247.70  109.07  181.37  278.45 
Rural: Per capita (kg)  128.16  149.06  203.74  268.67  156.43  233.01  331.87 
Total demand (mt)  1l1.75  132.99  177.98  218.36  139.57  203.55  269.74 
Total feed grain demand (mt)  193.88  238.91  345.76  466.06  248.63  384.92  548.18 
(b) High feeding efficiency 
Urban: Per capita (kg)  185.74  203.16  241.94  276.77  209.21  261.54  311.14 
Total demand (mt)  66,15  85.30  135.13  199.49  87.84  146.07  224.25 
Rural: Per capita (kg)  103.94  120.89  165,24  217.89  126.86  188.97  269.15 
Total demand (mll  90.63  107.86  144.34  177.09  113.19  165.08  218.76 
Totalfeed grain demand (mt)  156.78  193.16  279.47  376.58  201.03  311.15  443.01 
3.  Totallfood arulfeed) grain 
a) Low feeding efficiency 
Urban: Per capita (kg)  367.80  372.52  397.47  426.71  375.18  412,39  458.35 
Total demand (mt)  130.99  156.41  221.99  307.55  157.52  230,32  330.35 
Rural: Per capita (kg)  399.68  411.10  415.23  413.38  415.84  430.02  453.39 
Total demand (mt)  348.50  366.79  362.73  335.98  371.02  375.64  368.50 
Total grain demand (mf)  479.49  523.19  584.72  643.54  528.54  605.96  698.85 
b) High feeding efficiency 
Urban: Per capita (kg)  322.91  323.42  339.00  359.82  324.62  349.18  383.15 
Total demand (mt)  lI5.00  135.79  189.33  259.34  136.30  195.02  276.16 
Rural: Per capita (kg)  375.46  382.93  376.72  362.60  386.28  385.98  390.67 
Total demand (mt)  327.38  341.65  329.09  294.71  344.64  337.17  317.52 
Total grain demand (mt)  442.39  477.44  518.42  554.06  480.93  532.19  593.68 
(mt) denotes: million metric tons 
Source: Authors' projection. 
Note:*See text for food consumption assumption for each age group. 
34 3. Productivity Growth
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Introduction 
Grain output per head in China (with the exception of 
corn) has changed little over the last decade. The early 
gains  from  refonn  therefore  appear  to  have  been 
exhausted.  But  has  China  really  reached  a  frontier 
which is limiting the growth of output, either in tenns 
of technology  or  in  terms  of  the  organisation  of 
production? This section reviews recent research into 
this question. The issue is of great interest to Chinese 
policymakers, who continue to be concerned about the 
relative importance  of domestic compared to  import 
sources of grain. It is of great interest to the rest of the 
world,  which,  given the size of the economy, might 
expect  that  events  in  China  might  have  substantial 
effects  on  China's  trade  and  therefore  on  world 
markets for grain. 
The next part of this section of the report reviews 
the  trends in  grain output and notes  some of the key 
shifts  in  direction.  It highlights  the  developments  of 
the 1990s. We then examine in more detail the context 
in which farmers are making their output choices, and 
report work  on  mechanisms  by  which events  in  the 
rest  of  the  economy  affect  farm-level  decision-
making. A number of factors, some subject to change 
by  government policy,  which  might  have effects  on 
trends in output are then discussed. 
Trends in grain output 
Figure 7 shows the trend in  grain output per head in 
China since  1949.  A rising trend  in  output per head 
was established in the mid-1960s, but output per head 
appeared  to  stagnate  around  the  mid-1970s.  The 
introduction  of the  reform process  in  the  late  1970s 
marked a turning point. Grain output per head rose on a 
new trajectory and reached a peak in  1985. Thereafter, 
once again output per head appears to have stagnated. 
l4yhis part was originally prepared as Findlay (1997). 
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The  trends  in  output  relative  to  population  in 
China vary among types of grain. Figure 8 shows the 
trend  in  output  per  head  of wheat  over  the  same 
period. The growth in  output per head accelerated in 
the reform period, but since 1985 the trend is flat. Rice 
output per head  (Figure  9)  shows  a similar trend to 
wheat up to the mid-1980s, but since then rice output 
per head appears  to  have  fallen,  especially over the 
19908. 
The  exception  to  these  patterns  is  provided  by 
maize output per head (Figure  10) which in absolute 
tenns has  maintained the rate of increase established 
in the  19708. The trend in maize output per head 
appears to be immune both to the impact of the refonn 
program and to  the events driving the flat growth in 
the other crops si nce the mid-1980s. 15 
The next section provides more infonnation on the 
context in which fanners are making output choices in 
China. 
The economic context 
Growth and structural change 
Section  I  notes  that  the  impacts  of  growth  and 
internationalisation in the rest of the economy have a 
significant effect  on  agriculture,  including  the  grain 
sector. They are powerful contributors to the trends in 
output. Section I  therefore argues that there is a 
opportunity  cost  of  agricultural  output, 
especially in  some regions of China. An agricultural 
system  operating  at  frontier  efficiency  levels  would 
still  face  costs  of maintaining  that  level  of 
output.  The  outcome  is  then  likely  to  be  greater 
reliance  on  the  world  market  for  grain  supply. 
15 These data may even also understate the rate of growth of 
maize output if that type of grain is being increasingly 
diverted to anunal feed and not counted in the reported 
output. The likelihood that output is underreported is 
discussed later. 400 
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Figure 10.  Maize output per capita, 1952-95. 
However,  there  may  be  scope  to  increase output at 
relatively  low  cost when  the  agricultural  sector,  and 
grain production in particular. lies within the existing 
set  of production  possibilities.  These circumstances 
are discussed below. 
Impacts of labour mobility 
Wu and Meng (1996a,b) note that the rapid creation of 
jobs in other sectors of the rural economy has led to a 
concern about the relocation of  labour on the output of 
agricultural products, and of grain in particular. They 
use  household  survey  data  on  grain  specialist 
households I  6  to  examine  the  effects  of  labour 
relocation on grain output. 
Wu  and  Meng  (1996a)  first  examine  the 
contribution of labour to  grain output. They find that 
the return to labour time is relatively low (a doubling 
of labour input  in  terms  of time  would  raise  grain 
output by 6%). But the actual labour input is a bundle 
of worker time combined with farm worker experience 
and  worker education.  When  these factors  are taken 
into account. the elasticity of grain output with respect 
to incremental labour input rises to 26%. Farm worker 
experience is twice as important as  worker education 
in their model. The contribution of education to grain 
output  growth.  and  to  household income growth.  is 
further discussed below. 
Wu and Meng argue that an important effect of the 
relocation of labour is likely to be from the change in 
16 These data were collected as a part of the project whose result' we 
here. See Wu (1997) for details. Hereafter these data are 
to as the CERU-MoA household survey data. 
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the mix of the characteristics in the agricultural labour 
force  in terms of its  experience, education  and  sex. 
They simulate the effects of the relocation of labour by 
changing  the  compOSItIOn  of  the  agricultural 
workforce,  holding  everything  else  constant.  They 
assume  that  in  its  absence  of labour  mobility  the 
agricultural work force in the household would have 
the  same  characteristics  as  the  whole  household  on 
average.  Generally  they  find  that,  according  to  this 
method,  in  the  short  run  the  direct  effects  of  the 
relocation  of labour  on  grain  output  will  not  be 
significant. That result occurs in part because the more 
important contributors to grain output are experienced 
and older male workers. The labour that moves tends 
to be younger workers with more education. 
Wu and Meng (1996a) note that the withdrawal of 
labour from agriculture will also lead in the long run, 
as  the relative cost of labour rises, to  the substitution 
of other inputs for labour. including capital and other 
purchased inputs.  They  also  argue  that current farm 
sizes in China limit the range of technological options 
and that larger farm and plot sizes will be required to 
facilitate the substitution of other inputs for labour. As 
that happens, they suggest. the education level of farm 
workers may become a more important determinant of 
grain output. 
Investment 
Grain production may also be affected not only by the 
substitution of purchased inputs for labour but also by 
the  investment  that  follows  the  rise  in  household 
income  which  is  associated  with  the  relocation  of labour.  Wu and Meng (1996b) find  that the stock of 
capital  in  grain  production  (in  grain  specialist 
households)  does  rise  faster  than  total  household 
income, but only as all  other factors are held constant. 
They find that as the share of non-agricultural income 
in total income rises, households tend to invest less in 
grain production, indicating the lack of profitability of 
grain  production  compared  to  the  alternatives.  This 
issue of the distortion of farmer incentives that are a 
consequence  of  government  intervention  in  the 
marketing  system is  discussed in  other work in this 
project  (see  e.g.  Findlay  and  Watson,  1996a).  Fan 
(1996a)  reports  that  government  investment  in 
agriculture reached a peak in 1978, then nearly halved 
in real terms by 1987 and rose again in the first half of 
the  1990s.  However, the  value in  real  terms in  1994 
was  nearly  a  third  lower than  in  1987.  Nor has  the 
slower rate of farmer investment in  agriculture been 
offset by public projects. The state had for some time 
been  using  the  pricing  system  applying  to  grain  in 
particular to transfer resources out of agriculture. Thus 
agriculture  was  not  only  under  pressure  from  the 
structural change in the economy, but was also subject 
to  deliberate  taxation  by  the  state  (Findlay  and 
Watson,  1996a).  Fan  (1996a)  also  stresses  the 
fluctuations in investment, the decline in investment in 
research  and  development  and,  during  the  slump  in 
investment after 1978, the rundown in the capacity of 
the irrigation and drainage systems. 
Current issues in the agricultural research system 
are  discussed  in  more  detail  below.  Issues  in  other 
agricultural  infrastructure  sectors,  such  as  irrigation, 
are topics for further work. 
Land losses 
Concern  is  often  expressed  about  the  loss  of 
agricultural  land  in  China.  Various  estimates  are 
available  of  the  extent  to  which  land  is  being 
transferred to other sectors, which appears to be large 
in  absolute terms.  However, the rate at which land is 
being transferred to other uses appears to be relatively 
low.  Dong  (1996)  reports  data  which  suggest  that 
between 1958 and 1993, arable land area fell by 12%. 
Dong's data even suggest that the rate at which arable 
area is falling has been less since 1978 (0.31% a year) 
compared  to  the  pre-reform  period  (0.36%  a  year). 
Lindert (1996) also provides a similar estimate of the 
rate at which land is being transferred to other sectors. 
At this estimated rate, it would take two decades for 
Chinese agriculture to lose 10% of its land area. 
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There  are  also  offsetting  forces.  Some 
commentators argue that new arable land areas can be 
developed (Dong 1996) so that the area of arable land 
can respond to rising land values. Grain-sown area in 
China  can  also  follow  a  different  trend  to  general 
arable  area,  not only  because  of the  composition  of 
agricultural output, but also because within the grain 
sector there  is  scope to  increase the  rate  of double-
cropping. Its growth has contributed to the increase in 
total output even though the amount of arable area has 
fallen. 
The extent of multiple cropping over time depends 
on the regional distribution of the loss of arable land 
- those areas where the multiple cropping rate is high 
are  also  losing  arable  land  at  a  faster  rate.  The 
implications of regional  variations  in the  impacts of 
forces  for structural change are discussed in the next 
section. 
Actual  land  area  in  China has  in  the  past been 
underreported.  Even  so,  the  changes  in  the  rate  of 
decline  of arable  areas  may  still  be  reliable  unless 
incentives for underreporting have changed over time. 
The  implications  of underreporting of land  area are 
discussed below. 
Another  offsetting  factor  to  the  loss  of land  to 
other uses is that other inputs can substitute for land in 
the  production  process,  for  example,  irrigation  and 
fertiliser.  Lindert  (1996)  raises  the  related  issue  of 
whether the process of the loss of land to other uses 
has the effect of the lowering the quality on average of 
the  land remaining.  One  hypothesis  is  that  the  best 
land is converted to urban use. But Lindert argues that 
industrialisation  and  urbanisation  could  have 
offsetting  effects  since  more  effort  is  put  into 
improving  the  quality  of  the  land  remaining  in 
agriculture. This is a question for further work. Lindert 
provides some estimates (his Table 8)  which suggest 
the net effect of industrialisation and urbanisation on 
average soil quality could be positive, particularly in 
terms of its content of organic matter and nitrogen.17 
Policy reactions 
These  patterns  of  structural  change  are  not 
independent of policy  reactions,  for  example,  to  the 
rise in or expected rise in the import penetration of the 
market  for  grain.  Grain  prices  in  China  since  later 
1994 have been higher than world prices, which is  a 
17 Another question is whether agricultural use itself is degrading soil 
quality. Lindert (1996) finds little supporting evidence for this in 
China, particularly for those soil characteristics which matter for 
agricultural production. consequence of the trends in  supply noted in Figures 
7-10  compared  to  the  growth  in  demand,  in  the 
context  of restrictions  on trade.  The  origins  of and 
risks  associated  with  this  position  are  discussed  in 
more detail in the final section of this report. 
A  more  immediate  issue  is  the  change  in  the 
management  of grain  sector  policy,  particularly  the 
devolution  of responsibility  to  provincial  and  lower 
levels  of  governments.  Some  implications  of  this 
change,  in  terms  of the  use  of subsidies  for  grain 
production and the lack of transparency in grain sector 
policy, were discussed earlier in Section 1. 
Grain sector performance 
There  has  been  debate  over  the  effects  of  the 
agricultural  reforms  in  China.  Watson  (1994)  has 
reviewed the  literature in  general, and Carter (1995) 
focused  on  econometric  work  on  the  sources  of 
agricultural output growth. Input growth is  obviously 
one contributor to output growth. Studies of the other 
sources  of  growth  can  be  di vided  into  different 
schools.  Some  put  more  stress  on  technological 
change,  others favour the  importance of institutional 
change,  such  as  the  household responsibility  system 
(HRS),  and  others  stress  the  contribution  of  and 
continuing importance of market reform  and  'getting 
prices right' .18 Recent work, particularly papers using 
the  CERU-MoA  household  survey  data,  are  now 
reviewed under these three headings. 
Technological change 
Some of the work on accounting for sources of  growth 
in  Chinese  agriculture  has  put  more  weight  on  the 
contribution  from  technological  change,  especially 
after  the  first-round  effects  of institutional  change 
have been exhausted (see e.g. Huang, Rosegrant and 
RozelIe, 1996). 
An  issue  in  the  assessment  of  the  scope 
technological change plays in that role is the estimate 
of the  current  grain  yield  in  China.  Estimation  of 
yields is complicated by errors in the data on land area. 
Reported land area in  China has been  understated, at 
least  according  to  the  latest  official  land  survey  in 
China,  which  revealed  a  figure  significantly  higher 
(20%)  than  previous  estimates  of  arable  areas. 
18 There is also other work, including by Zhong and Carter (1995). 
which stresses the importance of the weather in patterns of grain 
production over time, and by  Huang and Rozelle (1995a), who 
highlight the contribution of an increased inability of production to 
withstand the effects of natural disasters, rising salinity and soil 
erosion, 
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Underreporting does therefore appear to have been a 
problem. Its presence reflects the incentives created at 
the  local  level  by  the  land  tax  system  and  by  the 
requirements the state imposes on the  grain sector to 
supply  grain  at  lower  prices  to  the  state  marketing 
system. Concealing the amount of land available may 
reduce  tax  commitments  imposed  on  anyone 
community. 
If on  the  other hand  grain  output  is  measured 
correctly then  the estimated yield  (output divided by 
area) will be overstated. 19 Assessments of the scope to 
inerease yields based on comparisons of actual yields 
in  China  with  those  defined  to  be  'frontier'  levels, 
according  to  overseas  experience,  for  example,  will 
therefore be biased toward the conclusion that there is 
little scope for such an increase in yields in China. The 
correct measurement of yield, however, may lead to a 
more optimistic view of scope for its improvement. In 
that  case,  further  technological  change  has  a  larger 
role  to  play  than  would  be  suggested  by  yield 
estimates based on underreported land areas. 
Yang  Hong  (1996d),  using  the  CERU-MoA 
survey data, found that the average land area reported 
by  households  is  approximately  17%  larger than the 
figure reported by villages. This appears to be another 
piece of evidence that in previous years reported areas 
have been understated. Yang Hong also found that the 
village  appears  to  have  reported  a  figure  close  to 
actual  yields  to  higher  levels.  This  result  suggests 
another  possibility  which  is  that  rather  than  yields 
being underreported, it is output, at least at the village 
level,  that is  likely  to  be  underreported.  Some grain 
output  is  therefore  concealed from  higher  levels  of 
government.  This  output could  be  diverted  into  the 
animal sector and not appear in the marketing system 
in its raw form. If  this diversion has increased over the 
last decade, as demand for animal  products increased 
and  as  the  marketing  system  for  those  products has 
been  reformed,  then  the  official  data  may  also 
understate the rate of growth of grain output.20 
A  comparison  more  relevant  than  comparing 
aggregate  average  yields  in  China  with  some 
assessment of potential based on experience in the rest 
of  the  world  is  the  assessment  of  actual  versus 
19 Crook and Hunter Colby (1996) suggest that the State Statistical 
Bureau overstates yields (which it also measures using sample survey 
cUllings) in order to compensate for the understatement of land area. 
20 This result might also help explain part of the apparent 
inconsistency between the growth in grain output in China and the 
growth in meat output. For a discussion of other contributors 
including the role of grain imports. see Lu Feng (I  996a,b). 
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The problem is to find an estimate of potential yield. 
Lin  and Shen (1994) have undertaken a study of 
the  potential  to  increase  rice  yields  by  comparing 
actual farm yields with assessments of what is possible 
provided by agronomists and scientists working in the 
industry. Lin and Shen distinguish between two yield 
gaps.  The  first  is  the  gap  between  the  maximum 
experimental  yield  and  the  best possible  farm  yield. 
The second  is  the  gap between the best possible and 
the  actual  farm  yields.  They  find  a  significant 
combined  gap,  for  example,  cases  where  the 
maximum  yield is  three times the actual farm  yield. 
Most of the gap (about 70%) is due to the first type of 
gap. Un and Shen argue that there may be high returns 
to research into how to reduce the factors they identify 
as  contributors  to  both  gaps.  Biotechnological 
research, they suggest, may offer the highest returns. 
Other work uses different methodology to evaluate 
the  returns  to  further  investment  in  research  and 
development  in  China.  As  noted  above,  work  on 
accounting  for  the  growth  in  grain output in  China 
reveals  that  in  the  past  technological  change  has 
played an important role. A more recent paper tries to 
find  a  direct  link  to  research  effort,  rmher  than 
inferring  the  contribution  of  technological  change 
from  the  unexplained  part  of the  trends  in  output 
growth.  Fan (l996b) includes a research variable in a 
production function study of the trends in grain output 
over time.  By  assumptions about the  lagged 
structure  of the  effects  of research,  Fan  is  able  to 
estimate returns to agricultural research in the range 
44-169%. 
Even  if  there  are  high  returns  to  agricultural 
research,  would  the  investments  be  made?  Rozelle 
(1996) and Fan (l996a,b) have reviewed the reforms, 
including  commercialisation,  in  the  agricultural 
research and development system in China and the fall 
in  real spending on research. Research in recent years 
does not appear to be contributing to an increase in the 
yields  of  commercially  used  grain  varieties.  The 
number of new varieties has increased but the rate of 
inerease is lower in the first half of the 1990s than in 
the second half of the 1980s. These results raise some 
questions about the benefits of the reform process in 
this  sector.  Rozelle  and  others  also  note  that  a 
remaining issue in  the reform process in this sector is 
the strengthening of the property rights regime. 
The evaluation of the  research sector is  an  issue. 
As Rozelle notes, the result that yields of  new varieties 
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are  constant could conceal  other  features.  The data 
used  to  evaluate  research  performance  refer  to 
varieties  in  commercial  use.  Market  and  profit-
oriented  farm  households  may  now  be  selecting 
varieties which contribute more to  household income 
than to  output. The new  varieties  may  require fewer 
inputs, for example. This question is a topic for further 
work,  and  could  indicate  success  in  the 
commercialisation process in the research sector rather 
than poor performance. 
Pray, Rozelle and Huang (1996) also review some 
of the related issues in the reform of the seed industry 
in  China and  stress  the  returns  to easing  barriers  to 
entry into the market for seeds to raise to the extent of 
competition in the market and the returns to removing 
residual controls on seed prices. 
The household survey data available in this project 
reveal some features of seed use in grain production. 
Grain for seeding is an important use of grain output. 
The ratio of seed input to grain output, according to 
the  CERU-MoA  survey  data,  is  3.4%  for  winter 
wheat,  0.6%  for  middle-late  indica  and  0.9%  for 
maize.  Some  estimates  indicate  that  there  is  also  a 
significant loss of seed in the sowing process. Greater 
efficiency in seed use could make available millions of 
tonnes of grain for other uses. 
Harry Wu,  in work in  progress on farmer choices 
about  seed  use,  has  identified the  following  testable 
hypotheses: 
farmers tend to choose high-yield varieties if they 
are subject to sales quotas with fixed state prices, 
that  is,  they  emphasise  quantity  rather  than 
quality;  at  the  same  time,  under  central 
government pressure to meet output targets, local 
governments  have  strong  incentives  to  develop 
and promote high-yield varieties; 
the nature of varieties that have been used in the 
past  determines  the  frequency  of  change  of 
vanetles  hybrid  rice  varieties  often  require 
more frequent changes in seeds; 
farmers'  response to the availability of high-yield 
varieties  is  subject to their budget constraint, the 
parameters of which are seed quality, the  of 
new  seeds/varieties  and  the  cost  of  associated 
inputs (many new varieties  higher input of 
fertiliser  and/or labour;  in  fact,  many  high-yield 
varieties are developed to be more responsive to 
fertiliser  and  intensive  labour  input:  quality 
matters, since farmers have to  use more seeds or 
have to reseed if the emergence rate is low). Preliminary  survey  findings  using  the 
CERU-MoA data include the following points. 
•  Almost all  grain  farmers  surveyed have changcd 
varieties  since  the  introduction  of thc  HRS,  not 
only for thc  major crop, but also for  other crops, 
e.g. 9~%  of rice farmers in Guangdong and 92% of 
rice farmers in Jiangxi have changed varieties for 
the same crop since HRS. 
For  the  major  crop,  82%  of  the  households 
changed varieties at least three times  since HRS 
60%  at  least  four  times,  and  37%  at  least  fiv~ 
times,  and  20% of households  changed varieties 
6-10 times. 
More importantly, most (75%) households changed 
varieties  in  1994-95  when  the  government  re-
emphasised quantity control over grain production 
through the governor responsibility system. 
For their  latest change  of variety,  new  varieties 
increased yield per (sown) mu by 43 kg for wheat, 
36  for early indica. 45 kg for late indica, 35 kg 
for japonica and 67 kg for maize. 
•  The survey also found that seed input (per mu) is 
positively  correlated  with  yield  and  negatively 
corrclated  with  the  price  of seeds  (statistically 
significant, the two factors can explain 30-40% of 
the quantity of seeds used). 
These results suggest that farmers do consider the 
effects of seed price and quality on yield. The rate of 
change to new varieties is also an indicator that farmer 
decision-making  is  not  necessarily  a  barrier  to  the 
introduction of new technologies at farm level. On the 
other hand. as reported in Section 2.  there appears to 
be  variation within the sample in the rate of 
use of seeds so that. while it is subject to economising 
behaviour by farmers in general, this input appears to 
be  one  in  which  there  is  considerable  scope  for 
technical  efficiency  gains.  A  side  effect  of greater 
efficiency in the use of seeds will be an increase in the 
availability of grain for other uses, 
In summary, research and development can clearly 
play an  important role  in  driving output in  the grain 
sector.  The  major  policy  issue  is  therefore  the 
management  and  evaluation  of  research  and 
development  programs  that  apply  to  grain.  Key 
elements  in  achieving  an  eftlcient outcome  will  be 
institutional changes in  the research sector and in the 
seed industry. A more developed seed market may also 
contribute to  improved performance in  terms of seed 
use  at farm  level. Choices of research effort in China 
will also be more efficient if they take into account the 
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cost of China's alternative sources of grain.  such  as 
purchases from the rest of the world. 
Institutional change 
Estimates of  productivity gains 
Huang and  Kalirajan  (1996)  argue there is  scope for 
yield increases which  appear  to  be higher for  maize 
than for other crops, and  higher in  Sichuan compared 
to  other  provinces  in  the  sample.  This  argument  is 
based on  their assessment of the  gap  between  actual 
output  and  an  assessment  of  potential  output  of 
between  33%  and  50%  of current  yields.21  These 
estimates are considerably less than those of Lin and 
Shen  (1994) whose type II  gaps range between 50% 
and 65%  of actual yields.  Perhaps the explanation is 
the  assessment  by  scientists  of  'yields  under 
favourable conditions', which are the source of the Un 
and  Shen  estimates  of potential  yields,  and  which 
exceed the  observed best commercial practice in  the 
household survey data. 
Huang  and  Kalirajan  find  that  the  gap  between 
actual  and  the  estimated  potential  performance  is 
smaller for each of rice, wheat and maize: 
if the household average education level is higher: 
if  the  household  head  has  longer  agricultural 
experience: 
if the total land area being farmed is larger; 
if the proportion  of the  grain  output sold to  the 
market is higher; 
the  higher the proportion of days  spent working 
otT the farm. 
Huang  and  Kalirajan  use  these  results to  stress 
short-term  in  productivity  that  might  be 
associated  with larger farm  sizes,  a  greater market 
orientation in  output (the marketing rate in the 
sample  is  still  only  just  over  one-third),  and  the 
growth of off-farm work. They stress, however, that 
in  the  longer run,  after the  immediate productivity 
gains are exhausted, some of these changes may  not 
have  net  positive  effects  on  total  output.  One 
example is structural change. including the growth of 
rural  industry,  the  impact of which  is  discussed  in 
Section 3. 
These results highlight both the role of the extent 
of use  of markets and other institutional changes, for 
21  Potential. output i~ derived from an estimate of the production 
fronller which IS eSllmated by including only factors of production in 
the  equation. Other contributors to variations in output ace 
m the second step of the analysis applied by Huang and 
Kalirajan, example, those affecting land area, in the performance 
of the grain sector. The rest of this section concentrates 
on input markets. noting not only the output effects but 
also  other  consequences  of reform.  The  impacts  of 
output market  developments  on  productivity growth 
are discus~ed in the following section. 
Plot consolidation 
Issues  associated  with  the  scale  of production  are 
examined  by  Nguyen,  Cheng  and  Findlay  (1996). 
According  to  their  results,  there  is  a  statistically 
significant positive relationship between plot size and 
output for  all  three crops - maize,  wheat  and  rice. 
However, the positive relationship for rice is obscured 
by  differences  in  varieties,  by  the  labour-intensive 
nature of rice  production and by  the very small plot 
size  in southern  China where  rice  is  mainly  grown. 
The elasticity of wheat and maize yields (and all other 
inputs constant) with respect to  plot size is  estimated 
to be 17%. 
The  generally  observed  positive  relationship 
between plot size and output for major grain crops in 
China (Nguyen,  Cheng and Findlay argue)  suggests 
that fragmentation involves a significant cost Further, 
they stress that they tested for the efl'ects of both farm 
size  (total  area)  and  average  plot  size  (total  area 
divided by  the number of plots). Immediate gains are 
associated with economies in plot size rather than farm 
size.22 
Given  fixed  land  areas  and  the  pressure  of 
continuing population growth, the already very small 
plots  of  land  in  many  areas  of  China  are  being 
fragmented further. The results of Nguyen, Cheng and 
Findlay  indicate this outcome could be expensive in 
terms of output foregone. The literature on this issue 
suggests  that  avoiding  this  outcome  will  require  a 
deepening  of  the  reform  process.  Experiments 
involving these practices, which are already underway, 
will  have to be promoted actively  in  other areas  of 
China  before  problems  of  falling  plot  size  are 
resolved. 
From an economic perspective, land consolidation 
in  China involves not only gains, but also costs. The 
possible  costs  include,  tlrst,  the  exposure  of small 
households to extra risks caused by land consolidation. 
For example, following land consolidation, the losses 
of crops  in  one plot due to  floods  or other natural 
Huang and Kalirajan found that total area was significantly related 
to productivity. although they did not include a plot size variable in 
their equation. and there is a correlation between Iota I area and 
average plot size. 
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adversities are less likely to be palliated by a good or 
normal harvest from plots in different locations. 
An issue related to  these questions of scale,  and 
interest in  either consolidating plots, increasing farm 
size, or both, is the land tenure system. The debate on 
land tenure in China is reviewed by Zhang, Huang and 
Rozelle  (1996).  The collective land of the  village is 
still controlled by  the leadership but can be allocated 
in a  variety  of ways.  The mechanisms  involved  are 
characterised by a lack of security of tenure which can 
weaken  the  incentive  to  invest,  reduce  the  ease  of 
access  to  credit and,  in  the absence of a market for 
land-use rights,  deny  gains from  specialisation.  The 
empirical significance of these effects  is  a  topic  for 
further  work.  A  market  in  land-use  rights  (even 
without  private  ownership)  would  facilitate  both 
consolidation and the achievement of greater scale if 
they were profitable. Some models of or experiments 
with  new  land tenure  arrangements  in  Zhejiang  are 
examined by Fahlbeck and Huang (1996). 
Farmer education 
Another variable stressed by Huang and  Kalirajan is 
the  impact of education, or the  quality of the  labour 
input, on productivity. The impact of formal education 
is  examined  by  Nguyen  and  Cheng  (1996),  who 
question its  importance in  the performance of 
producing households. They report regression results 
using farm  income as  the dependent  variable  which 
suggest that: 
the  returns  are  statistically  significant  for  the 
education  of household  heads  but  not  for  the 
education of farm workers generally; 
the  returns  are  considerably  higher  for  the  first 
three  years  of education  of the  household  head 
than for subsequent years. 
Wu and Meng (1996a,b) and Cheng (1996) report 
other  equations using grain output as  the 
dependent  variable  in  which  the  education  level  as 
well  as  work  experience  of  household  heads  is 
important. 
Nguyen and Cheng argue their results confirm that 
household  heads,  who  are  decision-makers  within 
each farm,  are handicapped in  getting the best of the 
improved  seeds  and  modern  agricultural practices  if 
they cannot read or write. 
The problem is to measure aceurately the size of 
the link  between education and  income.  Even if that 
link is now small, the importance of education is likely 
to rise.  Wu  and Meng (1996a)  also  argue  this  case. Cheng (1996) observes that with the increased use of 
chemical  fertilisers,  new  seeds  and  other  modem 
inputs. grain production becomes increasingly capital-
intensive, and hence demand for quality labour inputs 
rises  (that  is,  more  educated  labour  becomes  more 
productive).  More  attention  should  be  given,  he 
argues,  to' further  education  and  training  for  those 
household-heads aged in their forties  and fifties who 
are usually the major decision-makers in China's grain 
production and marketing and who are less likely to 
move out of grain production completely. 
A  further  question  is  that,  if  education  is 
significant, how much is required? At present, returns 
to education beyond a basic level may be small. That 
was the main finding of Nguyen and Cheng (1996), 
whose  concern  about  econometric  qualifications  to 
their assessment  of the  relationship  is  not  likely  to 
affect this conclusion. However, for reasons discussed 
by Cheng (1996) and others, the returns to longer-term 
education are likely to rise over time. 
Off-farm 11lork 
Another interesting issue in household management is 
the role  of off-farm  work  by household heads.  The 
results are mixed. Huang and Kalirajan (1996) argue 
that  the  extent  of  off-farm  work  in  industry  is 
positively related to productivity in grain production. 
While  families  for  whom  off-farm  work  is  more 
important may  spend  less  time  on  farm  work,  they 
may work more productively when they are spending 
time on  the  farm.  Yang  Hong (1996c),  on  the  other 
hand,  finds  a  negative  relationship  between  grain 
output  and  the  share  of non-farm  income  in  total 
household income (all other inputs constant),23 
Cheng's 1996 study examined a particular form of 
off-farm work,  He found that there is  an association 
between  the  official  position  of the  household head 
and  grain  output.  Cheng argues  (based on his  field 
work) that there is no systematic relationship between 
official  positions  and  better  quality  of  land.  The 
positive effects of official position on grain output are 
more likely to be caused by the collective ownership 
of some large farm equipment and privileged access to 
state-subsidised  farm  inputs,  public  goods  such  as 
irrigated  water,  and  technical  information  and 
supporting services. 
One  interpretation  of  this  outcome  is  that  it 
represents a form of compensation for undertaking an 
23 The difference in results could reflect the statistical methods used 
which treat in different ways the measurement errors likely to be 
associated with the input variahles, 
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official task in the village. Cheng notes the problems 
associated  with  this  approach,  He  prefers  instead  a 
market  solution  of  both  higher  prices  to  grain 
producers  to  encourage  on-farm  productivity,  and 
direct compensation to officials for time spent in that 
role, One option he suggests would be the creation of 
one or two full-time positions for village officials and a 
reduction  in  the  total  number  of  village  officials 
(currently  there  are  about  three  to  five  part-time 
village officials paid from the land-use fees). 
Fertiliser 
Efficiency  of fertiliser  use  is  discussed  by  Cheng, 
Nguyen  and  Findlay  (1996).  They  examine  the 
allocative  efficiency  in  the  use  of urea  (the  main 
component of which is nitrogen) and an  aggregate of 
all  other  fertilisers  (e.g.  phosphates)  in  production. 
They apply the profit-maximising firm's rule on input 
use to tlnd that urea is undemtilised in all but one of 
the counties in the sample, while other fertilisers were 
underutilised  in  Jiangxi  but  ovemtilised  in 
Guangdong.24 
Field work by Cheng suggests that a contributor to 
the allocative  inefficiency of rice producers  was  the 
risk  involved in  the  adjustment of input use,  which 
was related to the lack of knowledge of the technical 
relations between input and output for rice production. 
For example,  following  an  increase  in  the  price of 
urea,  households  may  not  reduce  their  use  of urea 
accordingly,  if they  were uncertain about the  output 
effects of such a reduction. They may  be  concerned, 
for  example,  that  a  small  decrease  in  fertiliser  use 
might lead to a  fall in output. They are therefore 
conservative and base their input choices on their own 
limited  of the technical relationship, 
The responsiveness of rice producers to changes in 
input and output prices in  southem China could have 
been influenced as well by other factors, the range of 
which includes: 
the lack of  price information for small rice producers; 
•  the  exaggeration  of price  fluctuations  associated 
with the barriers to trade between two provinces 
and between counties in a province; and 
messages  from  central  and  local  governments 
urging farmers to increase rice output following a 
fall in rice output since late 1993. 
24 There are qualifications to these results because of  omitted 
variables problem (related to the exclusion of a soil quality variable 
and organic fertHsers, data for which were not available) and also 
because of the aggregation of  the fertiliser types, Huang and 
Kalirajan (1996) also found that overall fertilisers were used 
relatively inefficiently. The inefficiency of fertiliser use could also be due 
to local shortages of fertilisers  (particularly urea), or 
credit to  pay  for  them,  Policy implications therefore 
include  the  value  of more  technical  information  to 
farmers,  but  provided  in  the  context  of economic 
decision-making,  not  output  targets.  There  are  also 
some interesting technical issues in the impact of urea 
use in southem China. and about the benefits of other 
methods  of fertiliser  application  compared  to  those 
currently in use. 
Review 
Markets  for  inputs,  including  land,  labour,  and 
purchased  items  such  as  fertiliser  matter  for 
productivity  growth.  Current  restrictions  on  some 
agricultural input markets reflect the absence of other 
markets,  for  example,  for  dealing  with  risks  in 
agricultural  production.  The  data  suggest  that 
institutional  changes  in  these  areas  can  have  a 
significant  effect  on  productivity.  For  example, 
significant benefits  would be available,  according to 
this  research,  from  institutional  changes  which  led 
farmers themselves to consolidate their plots of land. It 
is  stressed,  however,  that  in  markets  other 
than those for farm land would be required in order for 
consolidation to be efficient. There may also be  high 
returns to information about the effects of fertilisers in 
grain  production  and  about  methods  of application. 
Longer-term issues include decisions on the extent and 
funding of farmer education in China. 
Market development 
The  development  of the  grain  marketing  system  is 
discussed  in  more  detail  by  Findlay  and  Watson 
(l996b)  and  Watson  (1996).  Obviously,  changes  in 
relative prices that emerge from  market reforms affect 
trends  in  grain  output.  Findlay and Watson  (l996b) 
document examples of the  supply  response  of grain 
output  to  relative  price  associated  with 
marketing system reforms.25  In  this  section,  focus  is 
on the way that the development of markets affects the 
productivity with which resources are used, rather than 
on  volumes  of  inputs  applied  to  agricultural 
production. 
25 A recent example is the very high grain output expected in 1996. the 
result not only of good weather in some parts of China but also the 
increase in sown area, The increase in sown area is likely to be the 
result of expectations of higber prices for  based on prices 
received in 1994 and 1995. and incentives  from the 
application of the governor responsibility system,  large output and 
the accumulation of stocks in  1996 is likely to lead to expectations of 
lower fmure prices and a reduced sown area next year, 
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Marketing rate 
Huang  and  Kalirajan  (1996)  tested  the  effect of the 
rate at which households sold their grain on the market 
on the productivity of the household. They found that 
more  market-oriented  households  use  inputs  more 
productively in the case of all three crops. Huang and 
Kalirajan also expected that a higher state share in a 
household's  marketed  output  may  not  encourage 
farmers  to  produce  that  output  efficiently.  A 
relationship in  this direction was found in the case of 
wheat but not for rice and maize. 
Other  researchers  have  found  a  positive 
relationship between the size of the quota and output, 
for example Sicular (1995)  finds  first  that quotas do 
affect the allocation of resources at farm level: quotas 
are not inframarginaL She finds also that quotas have 
the significant effect of taxing household income. But 
quotas  in  her results  appear  also  to  have  a  positive 
effect on productivity.  One explanation  is  that  other 
services  are  provided  alongside  the  quotas,  for 
example,  the  provision of new  techniques,  access  to 
fertilisers  which  might  otherwise  be  constrained, 
access  to  credit  to  buy  inputs  in  an  efficient 
combination, supervision by local officials of on-farm 
choices, and provision of farm services at lower costs 
on a collective basis.26 
One interpretation of these results is that the quota 
system  is  a  second-best  method  of  achieving  an 
efficient  allocation  of the  available  inputs  into  the 
production  process  among  households.  The  quota 
system is acting as  an assessment of the  appropriate 
degree  of  specialisation  by  households  in  grain 
production.  Available  inputs  are  being  allocated 
accordingly, and access to those inputs has effects on 
total grain output of the household, not just the quota 
component.  However,  these  effects  are  likely  to  be 
larger in richer counties  which provide subsidies for 
grain production. 
The alternative to  this  use  of the  quota system is 
not only to  let households make their own choices of 
their  specialisation  in  grain  production  but  also  to 
reform  input markets  so that the  market mechanism 
can achieve the efficient allocation of inputs into grain 
production. The net effect is likely to be, according to 
results  reported  here,  higher grain  output.  Concerns 
about food supply security, which is one origin of the 
26 One explanation for the difference between the results of Sicular 
(1995) and those of Huang and Kalirajan (1996) about the impact of 
quotas is that they use different data sets, Sicular uses data fmm one 
county in northern China. quota system. can be met through the development of 
a more market-oriented production process. 
Barriers to market integration 
Another marketing issue is the set of barriers to inter-
regional trade in China. These barriers could be due to 
the  presence  of  bottlenecks  in  the  transport 
infrastructure or to deliberate policy choices such as 
the  governor  responsibility  system  (see  Cheng, 
Findlay and Watson, 1996), to cause each region to be 
more  self-reliant.  If those  barriers  were  significant, 
then  the  consequence  is  a  lack  of specialisation  by 
region  within  the  sector.  The failure  to  pursue 
specialisation  means  that  some  output  is  foregone. 
When  regions  specialise  they  concentrate  on  grains 
with lower opportunity costs in terms of other types of 
grain  foregone.  When  differ  in  their 
opportunity  costs  of production  of various  types  of 
grain, as is the case in China, then the output foregone 
in one region can be more than offset by increments to 
output in other regions. The grain output of the whole 
economy is increased as a consequence. 
Of course  the  same  issues  arise  with respect to 
choices between grain and other goods and services. In 
particular, there is the question of whether the prices to 
which  Chinese  farmers  are  responding  are  divorced 
from  world  prices,  and  therefore  from  the  point  of 
view  of the  whole  economy  whether  an  inefficient 
volume  of grain  is  being  produced,  compared to  its 
real cost of procurement from the rest of the world. 
Barriers  to  market  integration  have  a  second 
important  consequence  from  the  point  of view  of 
output decisions. While demand for grain is relatively 
stable  within  anyone  region,  the  supply  within  a 
region can fluctuate significantly as a result of changes 
in  weather,  in  relative  prices  of other  crops  which 
affect  supply  decisions,  or  in  local  policy.  The 
eonsequence is  likely to be a greater degree of price 
instability. In more  markets there is  also a 
lower degree of correlation between prices and yields 
in anyone region. Market development also lowers the 
costs of making transactions. 
Park  (1995)  models  the  effects  of  these 
dimensions  of  market  development  on  household 
behaviour  in  the  presence  of  yield  and  price 
uncertainty. Market development involves a number of 
offsetting effects.  Park finds  that the effects on grain 
storage  on  the  farm  and  on  grain  sown  area  are 
ambiguous. Complications arise from the dual role of 
households as both consumers and producers, in which 
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roles  price  fluctuations  have  different  implications. 
There  is  scope  for  further  work  to  identify  the 
empirical importance of the various effects in order to 
model  more  accurately  grain  producer  output  and 
storage decision-making. 
Conclusion 
Research reviewed here indicates that it is possible to 
raise  the  productivity  of  inputs  used  in  grain 
produetion in China, but the condition required for this 
change  is  an  even  greater  role  for  markets  in  the 
management  of  grain  production.  Contributors 
include: 
plot consolidation, facilitated by the development 
of land use markets; 
development  of  markets  for  other  purchased 
agricultural inputs; 
deregulation of the seed market. 
The greater degree of integration of domestic grain 
markets  would  also  have  significant  effects  on 
aggregate  output,  through  opportunities  for 
specialisation  and  trade  and  the  effects  on  technical 
efficiency  at  farm  level.  Pressures  for  structural 
change that vary between  will at the same time 
be changing the  mix  of grain  output that China can 
expect. These pressures will determine the patterns of 
trade in  grain in China through an  integrated national 
market. 
Despite the likely gains in economic terms, there 
are constraints to the deepening of the role of markets 
in  the  grain  sector  in  China.  Market  development 
inevitably  leads  to  substantial  redistributive  effects, 
involving  growers  of  trading  intermediaries, 
input suppliers and consumers. The sensitivity of the 
progress  of and  path  of market  development  to  the 
political  reactions  to  these  redistributive  effects  has 
been documented by Findlay and Watson (1996a). As 
they explain, a particularly important issue is the role 
of the grain bureaus. 
It is  also possible to  shift out the  position of the 
grain  production  frontier.  Substantial  increases  in 
yields even beyond those at the frontiers under current 
technologies appear to  be  possible. The issue in  that 
case is the management and evaluation of research and 
development  programs  that  apply  to  grain. 
Institutional changes in the research sector and in the 
seed industry, as noted above, are key  objectives.  In 
addition to market reforms, therefore, important issues 
include: the  extent  of public  investment  in  agricultural 
infrastructure and in research and development; 
the design of the extension system; and 
the  long-run  development  of farmer  education 
policy_ 
China can change its trend in grain output per head 
reported ;arlier. The question to be answered is what it 
will  cost,  to  change  the  trend.  There  are  reforms, 
including the development of input markets  and  the 
integration of output markets, that may be undertaken 
through  regulatory  reform  at  relatively  low  cost. 
Further output growth could involve more substantial 
investment and therefore lead to  challenges to policy 
makers  to  make  careful judgments  about  costs  and 
benefits. Using the  resources available in  the  rest of 
the world to supply grain to China is another option to 
be  considered.  Integration  of  the  domestic  and 
international  markets  for  grain  will  facilitate  the 
assessment of all  those options by exposing decision 
makers to world prices. 
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Review of projections 
There  is  a  variety  of  seenarios  for  China's 
international trade in grain over the next two decades 
(see Table 10). 
Outlooks differ significantly. Some are pessimistie 
about production growth: 500 mt is the upper limit in 
all  projections for the year 2000. Brown (1994,  1995) 
forecasts  a dramatic  decline  in  output,  mainly  due  to 
arable  land  loss  associated  with  salinisation  and 
erosion.  Projections  differ  in  the  outlook  for  output 
beyond  the  year  2000.  Some  are  optimistic  about 
production growth relative to consumption growth, e.g. 
the IFPRI group and Mei (1995), but not the OECF. 
These  scenario  differences  are  reflected  in  their 
ratios  of imports  to  consumption.  These  range  from 
less than 3% for Mei (1995) by the year 2020 to more 
than  20%  for  OECF (at  2010),  and  around  50%  in 
2030,  Brown.  Mei  argues  that  imported  grains  'can 
only play a role in adjusting the production' (p. 3). 
None of these projections allow for the impact of 
events in the non-agricultural sector. As Anderson and 
Peng (1996) point out, this means these projections do 
not  take  into  account  constraints  on  the  use  of 
resources  in  other sectors  or constraints  on  China's 
international transactions. They report the results of an 
application of a multisectoral model to this  problem. 
One scenario is based on  growth of GDP in China of 
7.8% a year through to the year 2005.28 The result is 
that  China is  projected  to import  33  mt  of grain  in 
27 This part is based on an extract from Wu and Findlay (1996), 
2li In this scenario, other economies in the rest of the world are also 
growing, at similar rates to China in the rest of East Asia and at 
slower rates in the developed economies,  The Uruguay Round (UR) 
outcome of multilateral trade negotiations is also implemented, which 
femoves export suhsidies for fann products, thereby boosting world 
trade in farm products and also prices of those products,  This price is 
not however sufficient to offset the long-term structural decline in 
food prices which is built into the model.  The UR also removes 
quotas on exports of textile and clothing products which also boosts 
the trade in those products but lowers their prices.  For details, see 
Anderson and others. 1996. 
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2005 and have a domestic grain self-sufficiency rate of 
96% (import dependence of 4%). 
Anderson  and  Peng  note  that  these  results  are 
relatively low compared to othcrs in Table 10, in part 
because  of  the  projected  growth  in  imports  of 
livestock and other food  products.29  A tighter set of 
trade restrictions on  those items would raise the level 
of grain import dependeney above 4%. 
In  the  early  19908,  the  bulk  of China's  grain 
imports  was wheat.  But  the  studies  reviewed above 
suggest a change in the import mix toward feed grain. 
This switch is  associated with growth in demand for 
meat,  egg  and  aquatie  products,  while  the  direct 
consumption of grain is expected to fall. 
The OECF study suggests that the bulk of import 
grain  will  be  feed  grain at  the  end of the  projection 
period. China will maintain its self-sufficiency in rice, 
according to  the OECF projections, and remain a net 
importer of wheat while maize imports boom. 
The IFPRI  study  notes  that the  rise  in  meat and 
other product consumption will raise the share of feed 
grain in total consumption from 20% in 1991  to nearly 
40%  in  2020.  In  its  projections,  feed  grain demand 
rises from  76 mt in  1991  to  108 mt in the year 2000 
and 232 mt in 2020. The study also reports that that by 
2020 'wheat will still account for most imports'. 
Gamaut  and  Ma  (1992)  eoncl uded  that  the 
outcome  would  depend  on  Chinese  trade  policy,  In 
1992, the  Chinese  grain market was  closed off from 
the  world  market  to  a  eonsiderable  extent.  and 
domestic prices were below what were then low world 
prices (see Figure  1).  They anticipated that either the 
relationship between domestic and international prices 
or  the  closed  nature  of the  grain  economy  would 
29 China pays for these imports by expanding net exports of 
manufactures, even though China is denied fulll access to the benefits 
of  the UR outcome because of lack ofWTO membership. China's 
export growth is concentrated in light manufactures not including the 
textiles and clothing category in this scenario. Table 10.  Review of projections of  China's grain trade to 2030 
Source  Period of  Consumption at  Production at  Net imports (unit)  AIB 
and year  projection  end point (E) (year)  end point  at end point (A)  % 
Tyers and Anderson  1990-2000  510 mt in 2000  420mt in 2000  90 mt in 2000  18 
1992 
Garnaut arltl Ma  1990-2000  Normal growth  Upper 1imt of  Normal growth 
1992  (6%  income growth):  500mt  (6% p.a. income growth:  9.1 
mt in 2000  50ml in 2000 
High growth  High growth  15.2 
(7.2% p.a. income growth):  (7.2% p.a. income growth): 
593 mt in 2000  90 mt in 2000 
Brown 1994  1990--2030  No rise in consumption p.c.: 272 mt in 2030  No rise in consumption p.c.: 
479 mt in 2030  207 mt in 2030  43 
Rise in consumption p.c.  Rise in consumption p.c. 
and rise in popUlation: 
641 mt in 2030 
Huang, Rozelle  Early 1990s  450 mt in 2000 
and Rosegrant  to 2000, 
(IFPRI) 1995  2010 
and 2020  600 mt in 2020 
OECF  1993 to  508 mt in 2000 
1995  2000.2005  571 mt in 2005 
and 2010  645 mt in 2010 
Mei  1993 to  511 mt in 2000 
1995  2000,2010  593 mt in 2010 
and 2020  695 mt in 2020 
change rapidly with continued rapid economic growth 
through  the  19908.  China would soon face  a choice 
between  Northeast  Asian-style  grain  protectionism 
(the  earlier choice  for  food  grains  in  Japan,  Taiwan 
and  Korea),  and  the  linking  of  domestic  into 
international markets. 
It was technically possible, they argued, for China to 
remain  self-sufficient  in  grain  with  Northeast  Asian-
style  protectionism. If this  were  the  choice,  domestic 
prices would rise well above the then current world 
prices.  High prices would encourage  grain  production 
and hold back consumption. Chinese economic growth 
would be held back, and the people's standard of living 
would  not  rise  as  much  as  the  country's  economic 
performance would otherwise be able to support. 
Alternatively,  China  could  choose  to  open  its 
agricultural  economy  to  foreign  trade,  while 
maintaining  the  liberalisation  of  domestic  grain 
markets that had recently been implemented. 
In these circumstances, continued rapid growth in 
incomes would lead to strong expansion of grain use, 
especially  for  animal  feed  and  industrial  purposes. 
Two approaches to estimation of demand were utilised 
by  Garnaut  and  Ma  one  based  on  published 
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and rise in population:  58 
369mt in 2030 
410 mt in 2000  40 mt in 2000,  S.S 
but not likely to 
be greater than 
550 mt in 2020  50mt in 2020  8.3 
484 mt in 2000  24 mt in 2000,  4.7 
502 mt in 2005  69 mt in 2005  12.1 
509 mt in 2010  136 mt in 2010  21.0 
500 mt in 2000  11  mt in 2000  2.2 
578 mt in 2010  15 mt in 2010  2.5 
675 mt in 2020  20 mt in 2020  2.9 
estimates of income elasticity of demand, and one on 
the  Taiwan  experience  at  a  similar  stage  of  its 
economic  development.  The  two  approaches 
suggested  broadly  similar  outcomes:  use  of 550  mt 
with normal economic growth, and 590 mt with high 
growth. Garnaut and Ma (1992) noted that the starting 
point  for  the  quantitative  analyses  preceded,  and 
therefore  abstracted  from,  the  major  upward 
adjustments in China's grain prices in  1991  and 1992, 
and therefore may have overestimated net imports in 
2000 by  an amount  that could not  be  calculated on 
data then available. Garnaut and Ma (1996, p. 61) later 
adjusted their expectations of net imports under free 
trade and  stable world prices (1990 levels) to  30-70 
mt to take account of this factor. 
On  the  supply  side,  Garnaut  and  Ma  (1992) 
undertook less detailed analysis. They concluded that, 
while  there  was biological  potential for  much larger 
increases, it was unlikely that grain production would 
grow more rapidly than population, that is, that it was 
unlikely  that  production  would  exceed  500  mt  with 
free trade and world relative prices remaining near the 
levels  of  1990.  They  noted  that  higher  levels  of 
production would be induced at higher prices. Garnaut and Ma also discussed in detail the likely 
change in  the mix of grain demand in China. In their 
high  growth scenario. the share of feed grain in  total 
grain consumption rises from 25% in 1990 to 33%  in 
the year 2000 (30% in the lower growth scenario) (see 
their Table 42. p.  98). They note that the mix of grain 
output is  highly  sensitive to shifts in  relative prices, 
but  expect  the  growth  in  imports  would  be 
concentrated in  feed  grains  and  to  a lesser extent in 
wheat and barley (p.  118). 
Food grain self-sufficiency 
This section highlights the significance of the demand 
projections reported in  Section 2 by  comparing them 
with a simple supply scenario. 
Supply assumptions 
A  simple  but  important  assumption  used  in  supply 
projections  is  annual  grain  output  growth.  The 
assumption may be  based on  a simple extrapolation of 
grain output in previous periods, or on the experience of 
other countries at similar development stages, or may be 
estimated  by  a  sophisticated  econometric  approach 
taking all possible factors affecting grain supply. Some 
supply  assumptions  consider only  technical  potential, 
while others take economic factors as well. 
Based  on  the  experiences  of  other  countries, 
Brown (1994) assumes that China's grain supply will 
decline  by  at least 0.5%  a  year  from  now  to  2030, 
compared with 1  % decline for Japan since 1960, 1.2% 
decline for Taiwan  since  1977  and  1.9%  decline for 
South  Korea  since  1977.  Carter  and  Zhong  (1988) 
project zero growth, while all other estimates of grain 
output are  positive.  Garnaut  and Ma (1992)  assume 
I %  for  the  slow-growth  scenario,  and  1.7%  for  a 
rapid-growth scenario. The OECF projection assumes 
that  grain  land  area and  yield  per  unit  of land  will 
continue  to  grow  annually  at  0.05%  and  1.75%, 
respectively, as they did in the period 1984-93 (OECF 
1995, Appendix 11,  Tables 2 and 3). Some projections 
assume a declining growth rate but one which is still 
positive, such as OECF (from 0.8 in 1993-2000 to 0.6 
in  2000-2010),  while  some  assume  an  increasing 
growth rate,  such  as  Lin,  Huang  and  Rozelle  (from 
0.7% in 1991-2000 to  1.4% in  2000-2010 and  1.6% 
in 2010-2020), which is less likely, considering rising 
opportunity cost of labour and land. 
Table 11.  Trade implications of the projected demand for food and feed grains for China under various scenarios to 2020. 
Food grain (mt)  Feed grain (mt)  Total grain (mt) 
1995  2000  20 I  0  2020  1995  2000  2010  2020  1995  2000  2010  2020 
Demand 
1. Low feeding efficiency scenario 
Income growth by 8% a year  286a  284  239  177  194"  239  346  466  480  523  585  643 
Income growth by 10% a year  286"  280  221  151  194"  249  385  548  480  529  606  699 
2. High feeding efficiency scenario 
Income growth by 8% a year  286"  284  239  177  157"  193  279  377  443  477  518  554 
Income growth by 10% a year  286"  280  221  151  157"  201  311  443  443  481  532  594 
Supply 
Assumed output growth since the 
end of the last period (% p.a.)  n.a.  O.Od  _1.7d  -3.Qd  n.a.  3.0  3.0  3.0  n.a.  1.1  0.5  0.6 
End-period supply  286b  284  239  177  181e  210  282  378  467<  494  521  555 
Balance 
1.  Low feeding eHiciency scenario 
Income growth by 8% a year  0  0  0  0  -13  -29  -64  -88  -13  -29  -64  -88 
Income growth by 10% a year  0  4  18  26  -13  -39  -103  -170  -13  -35  -85  -144 
2. High feeding efficiency scenario 
Income growth by 8% a year  0  0  0  0  24  17  3  I  24  17  3  1 
Income growth by 10% a year  0  4  18  26  24  9  -29  -65  24  13  -11  -39 
Source: Based on Table 9 and supply assumptions. 
Note: 
a Data are estimated actual demand in 1995 from Table 9, used as " starting point. 
b Assuming food grain supply met demand in  1995. 
c Estimated feed grain supply by subtracting food grain from total grain output in 1995 (467 ml). 
d Rates are  assuming China will meet its food grain demand as demand declines, at least in net tenus. 
e Actual grain output in  1995. 
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are one important reason for the variation but also, in a 
rapidly growing economy, there are offsetting forces, 
the relative importance of which is  difficult to judge 
without more detailed modelling work.  The previous 
section  o! this  report identified  a  number of policy 
changes  which  could  make  a  contribution  to 
productivity.  A  more  detailed  assessment  of their 
impact is also a topic for further work. 
While there is  no agreement on reasonable supply 
growth  assumption,  a  simple  supply  projeetion 
provides  a  background  which  to  judge  the 
sensitivity of the trade projections to the variations in 
demand parameters stressed. 
Here  we  assume  that  in  1995  demand  for  food 
grain was met in  net terms by  local  supply  and that 
China will be able to meet its (declining) demand for 
food grain from 2000 onwards at least in net terms -
China will show food  self-sufficiency.30 
We  assume  that  the  annual  growth rate of feed-
grain production is assumed to be 3% throughout the 
projection period, based on the growth of maize output 
in the past 10 years. 
Under  these  assumptions,  China's  total  grain 
supply in the year 2000 will be 494 mt as projected in 
Table 11, very close to the government's 500 mt target 
(see Luo 1995, 1996). The implied annual total grain 
output growth  will  be about  1.1 %  over this  period, 
slightly higher than the growth rate of 0.9% achieved 
since  the  reform.  This  rate  falls  to about  0.5-0.6% 
from 2000 to 2020, a decline from the previous trend, 
which may be reasonable. given the very likely rise of 
opportunity  cost  of increasing  grain  production  in 
China. As projected, China will be producing 521  mt a 
year by 20 I  0 and 555 mt a year by 2020. 
The trade implications in quantity terms will rely 
on  the  choice  of  economic  growth  and  feeding 
efficiency scenarios." If the 8% income growth rate is 
30 Food  output could decline faster than the rate required for 
sell',sufl1cien,:y in a free trade scenario, depending on the pressures 
in foodgrain-producing regions of China and the 
olrsetting effects  technologies.  In that case our assumption of 
food grain self-sufficiency could be met only by subsidies to 
production andlor protection. the welfare costs of which may be 
substantial.  A number of the CGE studies of  China's grain trade have 
also produced estimates of these sorts of  costs. 
3t The projections in Table 10 are described more accurately as the 
gap between  and consumption.  There is not 
neces:,ariJy a  to international trd.£lhactions because 
of changes in stocks and also  of the mechanisms for the 
management for international transactions.  The institutional 
arrangements for those transactions and their implications for 
observed trade patterns are beyond our scope here. 
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chosen, under the low feed efficiency scenario, China 
needs feed  grain  imports of 29  mt a  year by  2000, 
64 mt a year by 2010, and 88 mt a year by 2020. 
Under the high feed efficiency scenario China will 
still  enjoy a  surplus  by  2000 and  balance  by  2020, 
which is unlikely  to be possible.  If the results under 
low efficiency are scaled down by 25% to reflect some 
improvement  in  feeding  efficiency,  China  will  still 
need feed  imports of 22  mt a year by 2000, 48 mt a 
year by 2010 and 66 mt a year by 2020. 
These projections for total grain are summarised in 
Figure  I1  which  illustrates  the  sensitivity  of  the 
projections  to  assumptions  about  feeding  efficiently 
and about income growth. 
Comments on the projections 
We  concentrate here on the  outlook for China's feed 
grain imports  and  demonstrate  the  sensitivity  of the 
projections to changes in  income growth,  and  to  the 
efficiency  of  feed  use.  The  projections  also 
incorporate a more accurate assessment of popUlation 
growth compared to other studies, and also take into 
account the impact of changes in the structure of the 
population. Feed grain imports eould be nearly 90 mt 
by  2020  under  the  low  feed  efficiency  scenario. 
However,  the  pattern  of feed  trade  is  highly 
sensitive to developments in the  with which 
feed is used. 
There  is  a  number of other factors  to  consider 
when  assessing  the  outlook fOf  China's  trade, 
and  trade in  products like  meat based  on grain,  and 
which  suggest a  number of topics  for  further  work, 
such as: 
the choice of trade policy regime; 
the substitutability between food and feed grain; 
the  substitutability  between  imports  and 
meat imports. 
One  issue  is  the  choice  of policy  regime.  The 
projections reported here are based on the assumptions 
that  the  trade  policy  regime  permits  the  growth  in 
demand for feed  grain driven by  income increases to 
be  met  by  import growth,  while  the  outcome in  the 
food grain market is self-sufficiency. This highlights 
the sensitiVity of the projections to key parameters in 
the feed grain markets. 
We have assumed that China is self-sufficient in 
food  grain  production.  The  choice  of trade  policy 
regime for the grain sector will also have implications 
for the size of the grain-eonsuming meat industry and 
therefore  the  pattern of trade  in  meat.  A  protected 40 
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Figure 11.  Grain trade scenarios: net exports to 2020. 
grain  sector, for example, and a less restrictive meat 
sector  policy  will  lead  to  a  larger  volume  of meat 
imports.32 
We have also assumed there is no substitutability 
between  feed  and  food  grain,  whereas  a  feature  of 
China  is  a  degree  of  substitutability  between  the 
grains.  In  that  case,  a  higher feed  efficiency  which 
makes  available more grain for food  use  reduces  the 
rate of growth of food  grain output required for self-
sufficiency.  Alternatively,  more  rapid  food  grain 
output  growth  (a  consequence  of  technological 
change,  perhaps)  makes  it  easier  to  meet  domestic 
demand for feed grain, even in the low feed efficiency 
scenario. These interactions could also be examined in 
a more sophisticated modelling framework. 
32 Using the grain-meat conversion ratios of 6: 1 (kg) for red meat and 
3.5:1  (kg) for poultry meat (average levels of low and high grain-
meat ratios) and applying: a degree of improvement in feed use 
efficiency, then feed grain imports could be replaced by 3.7 mt of red 
meat or 6.3 mt of poultry a year by 2()()0, 8 mt of red meat or 13.7 mt 
of poultry  a year by 2010. and 1I Illt ofred meat or 18.9 mt of 
poultry a year by 2020, or apparently any combinations of the red and 
poultry meals. 
2010  2020 
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•  High feed efficiency: 
income growth  by 
8% a year 
High feed efficiency: 
income growth by 
10% a year 
D  Low feed efficiency: 
income growth by 
8% a  year 
•  Low feed  efficiency: 
i  neo me growth by 
100% a year 5. Policy Outlook 
Factors influencing the outlook for grain 
policy 
From  the  producers'  point  of  view,  the  growth  in 
purchase  prices  after  the  market  crisis  of  1993 
represented only a necessary recovery of the increases in 
production costs in recent years. But producers are faced 
with a government which tries to enforce deliveries to 
the  state  at  administratively  determined  prices,  and  a 
grain  bureau  system that is  subsidised  but attempts  to 
maximise its trading profits. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
producers  are  beginning  to look toward  higher  prices 
from  market  traders,  holding  on  to  stocks  to  affect 
market  prices,  and  trying  to  process  more  output  for 
themselves in order to capture the value added. 
From  the  household  consumer  point  of  view, 
growth in incomes and the shift to quality foods have 
made  basic  grain  prices  less  significant.  But 
consumers  are  concerned  about  inflationary 
expectations  and  have  growing  real  incomes.  While 
current overall output may  be  close to  total  demand 
(Zhu  Xinwu,  1995),  the  regional  distribution  and 
output mix is  not.  Quality grains and grains in  short 
supply are  thus likely to increase in price. while poor 
quality  grains  will  have  a  poor  market.  There  is 
already a broad perception that the grains people want 
to eat are  only available  at  higher prices on the free 
market,  and  that  the  state-supply  of  grain  is  not 
welcome. Furthermore, as grain prices rise, the prices 
of processed foods and meat also rise, though often at 
rates  substantially  above  those  of  raw  grain. 
Particularly sensitive consumers such as  students, the 
unemployed, people on low and fixed incomes and the 
army are also likely to exert political pressures. These 
dilemmas  invite  government  administrative  inter-
vention, even though that intervention may  not solve 
the underlying problem. 
To grain bureaus, the state-owned organisations in 
the grain distribution system, the underlying problems 
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of the  1990s remain clear.  These are being asked to 
become more efficient and more profitable, yet at the 
same time are expected to carry out policy roles which 
need subsidies and  may  not retlect market pressures. 
They are thus in  a position to  trade between plan and 
market  roles  to  maximise  profits,  and  to  find  their 
commercial aims  conflict with  the  policy  role.  They 
may seek to increase prices in order to improve profits, 
when  they  are  being  asked  to  sell  grain  cheaply  in 
order to  bring  down  costs.  They  may  prefer to  use 
capital  for higher-value  trading  than  in  building and 
holding  stocks  of  grain  for  market  stabilisation 
policies. Their position is thus a confused one. It also 
faces different pressures at the purchasing end (where 
prices may have to rise in order to obtain any stocks at 
all)  and  the  selling  end  (where  government  pricing 
measures, consumer demand and market supplies may 
exert contradictory pressures). 
Finally, the  problems of the relationship between 
production and consumption regions  and  central and 
local  government  continue  to  play  a  role.  The 
production  regions  tend  to have  lower incomes and 
smaller budgets. They want to maximise their profits 
and revenues from grain. The consumption regions are 
anxious to  maximise any subsidies for grain supplies 
and to minimise any costs of purchase. And the central 
and local  governments dispute  the relative  shares  of 
subsidies and costs of maintaining the managed part of 
the grain system. 
Overall, therefore, China's grain system reform is 
still  constrained  by  the  fundamental  issues  of  the 
government's  concerns  for  urban  consumers,  the 
pressures to maintain stability in  supplies and  prices, 
and  constraints  on  involvcment  in  world  trade 
stemming from the self-sufficiency goal. 
Reactions  to  these  forces  of political  economy 
have  led  to  considerable  debate  in  China  on  grain 
sector policy and to a variety of positions on trade and other aspects of grain marketing policy.  Elements of 
these positions include the following: 
Trade can only be used tofix the grain mix 
The role of trade is to adjust the mix of grain types 
available  in  China,  e.g.  by  exporting  maize  and 
rice  while  importing wheat,  while overall a high 
degree  of self-sufficiency  is  maintained,  China, 
because  of  its  size,  cannot  rely  on  the  world 
market. 
Domestic market integration is the key issue 
A  greater  dcgree  of  self-sufficiency  will  be 
possible,  and  the  role  of imports  reduced,  if the 
government  withdraws  from  regulation  of  the 
domestic market and encourages the integration of 
the market within China. 
There  has  been  too  little  investment  in  research 
and development 
There are significant returns to further investment 
in  research  and  development  that  will  raise  the 
degree of self-sufficiency by raising yields of both 
grain output per unit of land area and of meat and 
other products per unit of feed. 
Output  vvould  increase  if the  production  system 
was reorganised 
The  most  important  domestic  reform  is  the 
redesign of agricultural  production systems so as 
to yield greater scale economies. 
Grain market issues are macro-policy issues 
The link between macroeconomic performance of 
the  Chinese  economy  and  movements  of grain 
prices is the current key issue. 
Mei's 1995 set of projections provides an example 
of one view of  policy makers in China on prospects for 
the  trade. The  share of imports in  consumption 
remains  tiny.  While  consumption continues  to  grow 
rapidly,  there  is  substantial  scope,  in  Mei's  view,  to 
increase grain output. Luo (1995) makes a similar set 
of  observations  concerning  the  scope  for  output 
growth,  Contributors  in  Mei's  case  include  mainly 
return  to  research  and  development.  Investment  in 
research  and  development  also  plays  a  key  role  in 
promoting output growth in the IFPRI projection. 
Guo (1995b) provides an example of the view that 
stresses gains from domestic market refornl. He argues 
for  a  liberalisation  of the  state  purchase  price,  the 
extension  of subsidies  to  producers  for  inputs,  the 
development of a national grain market and separation 
within  the  market of administrative  and  commercial 
functions,  a  'balanced'  trade  in  grain  (exports  and 
imports  offsetting),  and  special  provision  for  low-
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income  households  to  have  access  to  grain.  People 
supporting this position stress tbe role of government 
as  managing  some  sort  of  reserve  scheme  or 
stabilisationmechanism (see Tang Renjian, 1995). 
The analysis by Brown (1994) summarised above 
reinforced  the  position  of those  who  are  concerned 
about  China's  reliance  on  world  markets  for  grain. 
World grain trade is currently of the order of 200 mt. 
Brown  was  forecasting  imports  by  China  of at least 
that  (by  2030)  and  possibly  of twice  as  much.  This 
perspective has been challenged. China may well be a 
relatively  large  trader  but  what  matters  is:  (a)  the 
comparison  of  its  consumption  with  world 
consumption, and (b) the supply response from the rest 
of the world following the growth in China's imports. 
A  protectionist  policy  is  actually  more  likely  to  be 
destabilising in the domestic markct than is a strategy 
of combining domestic supply  with the larger supply 
from the world market. 
Some  commentators  in  Beijing  now  accept, 
however, that imports will increase - the OECF 1995 
report, conducted in conjunction with MoA  officials, 
appears to have had some impact. The debate in  this 
case  moves  on from  outright rejection of use of the 
world  market.  The  issues  instead  are  the  ability  of 
China  to  export  other  products  to  earn  the  foreign 
exchange required  to  pay  for grain imports,  and  the 
composition of the imports of grain, in particular, the 
choice between food and feed imports. 
The link  between  grain  prices  and  inflation  has 
been a topic for debate in China and the issue has had 
some influence on policy. 
One view being argued in Beijing is that the price 
of grain  is  a  key  component  of movements  in  the 
general price level. Rising grain prices in other words 
lead to  higher inflation rates.  The policy implication 
drawn  from  this  model  is  that  grain  prices  should 
continue to be capped, or caps should be applied when 
appropriate. Price caps, however, can only be enforced 
alongside the reconstruction of the a marketing system 
in  which  state  intervention  and  coercion  play  key 
roles. 
This  argument is assessed by Johnson and Song 
(1995) who argue that the more important relationship 
operates  in  the  opposite  direction.  They  argue  that 
changes  in  the  general  price  level  can  affect  the 
relative prices of some commodities. The mechanism 
is that when households expect the rate of inflation to 
be high or increasing, they increase their grain stocks. 
Supply of grain in the market is reduced when stocks increase and the price of grain rises (in both nominal 
and  real  terms).  Grain  stocks  are  held  as  a  hedge 
against  inflation  in  the  absence  of  well-developed 
alternative forms of holding wealth. The use of grain 
for  this  purpose  does  affect  grain  prices  in  China: 
however, this effect would not be observed if domestic 
and international priees were more closely eonnected. 
Guo Shutian  (1 995b  )  also  argues  that the  source  of 
inflation is the level of investment in fixed assets, and 
that grain price rises merely reflect the response to this 
situation. 
The implication of the 10hnson and Song model is 
that intervention to cap grain prices will actually make 
worse  the situation that the  intervention  is  trying  to 
control.  Intervention  of  this  type  reinforces  the 
expectation  of  higher  future  inflation  rates.  Grain 
stocks are further  increased and the price of grain in 
the market place rises yet again.33 
The analytical aspects of these positions and the 
forces  from  the  interest  groups  reviewed  above  are 
boiled down in the political process to produce a grain 
sector  strategy.  In  their  review  of the  emphasis  in 
policy  shifts  over  time,  Garnaut,  Fang  and  Huang 
(1996) identify what they call a turning in the Chinese 
policy debate on grain marketing arrangements. 
Turning point? 
Garnaut, Fang and Huang argue that previous policies 
which discriminated against agriculture are coming to 
an  end.  They  go  further  to  argue  that  there  is  a 
possibility  that  the  Chinese  will  follow  other high-
income  Northeast  Asian  economies  into  a 
which  provides  subsidies  to  producers.  This  policy 
could  be  operated  by  raising  border  prices  of 
importable  agricultural  inputs,  by  the  imposition  of 
tariffs and quotas, rather than by paying explicit fiscal 
subsidies. 
A change in policy in the direction of protection is 
a  common  one  (see  Anderson  and  Hayami,  1986). 
There  is  a  strong  positive  correlation  across  a  very 
number of economies between the rate of change 
in discrimination in favour of farmers  in agricultural 
pricing  policy  and  (a),  the  growth  of the  level  of 
incomes and (b), the loss of agricultural  comparative 
33 Of course, the relationships could operate in both directions. 
Cheng Yuk·shing (1995) has argued that an upward spiral in the 
general price level can be triggered by an increase in the foodgrain 
price. in consequence of a wage indexation mechanism built into a 
model which he has constructed.  This model also  the 
relationship between changes in grain prices and 
stockholding decisions. 
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advantage.  Contributors  to  this  outcome  are  the 
differences in the costs of collective action by various 
interest groups in the policy-making process. 
At the early stages of development, farmers  face 
relatively high costs compared to urban employers and 
their workers. The result is a food pricing policy biased 
in favour of consumers.  But as  development occurs, 
these relative costs change and the policy regime shifts. 
Gamaut,  Fang  and  Huang  observe  data  which 
show domestic  prices  of maize crossing over world 
prices (see Figure  1).  They  note in other East Asian 
economies the pattem of policy development, which is 
characterised  by  rapid  increases  in  the  rate  of 
agriculture  sector  protection,  and  argue  that  in real 
terms China's income per head is now at levels similar 
to those at which the East Asian economies started to 
accelerate the  protection of agriculture.  So they  say 
'this is suggestive at least that this may be a time when 
China might  faee  pressures  to  turn  from  taxing  to 
subsidising agriculture'. 
A  fundamental  factor  associated  with  this 
tendency  is  the  loss  of comparative  advantage  in 
agriculture which occurs as  a result of the growth in 
incomes,  and  the  accumulation  of  factors  of 
production used intensively in other activities such as 
manufacturing.  The  implications  of this  process  for 
grain output were noted earlier.  Shifts in  output mix 
are also reinforced by reforms in the non-agricultural 
sectors;  again,  the  development  of  markets  for 
industrial  products  is  an  example.  Others  are  the 
freeing-up  of  the  foreign  exchange  market,  the 
demonopolisation  of  the  trading  system,  and  the 
reduction  in  the  use  of quantitative  restrictions  on 
imports and exports, as well as the general reduction in 
the schedule of tariff rates. The benefits to producers 
of border  protection  for  their  products  also  depend 
inversely on the extent to  which similar policies are 
applied to industries that produce agricultural inputs. 
For example, highly protective arrangements for other 
sectors such as energy or steel would reduce the gains 
to producers from agricultural protection. 
Events  in  the  world  market  also  matter - for 
example, the removal  of the multifibre arrangement, 
and  China's eventual  accession  to  the  WTO,  would 
also  strengthen  China's  comparative  advantage  in 
manufacturing.  WTO  accession  would  also  have 
implications  for  the  protection  which  China  could 
apply to the agricultural sector. 
An  important part of the political equation - the 
loss  of  agricultural  comparative  advantage  - is 
...... --~  .. ~  -----------certainly  present  in  the  Chinese  case.  There  are, 
however,  some  substantial  regional  variations  in  the 
rate  at  which  agriculture  is  losing  its  comparative 
advantage.  The  implication  is  that political  pressure 
for  a  reversal  of pricing  policy  is  likely  to  vary 
between provinces. 
A further qualification to this analysis is the extent 
to  which China can increase yields  (per unit of land 
area) in grain production (see Section 3). The various 
projections differ in their assessments of the scope to 
increase  output,  despite  the  pressure  to  reallocate 
arable land areas to other uses. Greater scope to raise 
yields  will  reduce  the  urgency  with  which  other 
strategies designed to achieve a greater degree of self-
sufficiency are pursued. 
Garnaut,  Fang  and  Huang  also  note  some 
qualifications  to  the  possibility  of rising  agricultural 
protectionism.  China  has  relatively  much  larger 
endowments  per  capita  of  agricultural  inputs  than 
those  of other  East  Asian  economies.  Agriculture'S 
share of the Chinese economy is  much higher than it 
was  in  other East Asian  economies when  protection 
accelerated. The share of the agricultural labour force 
in the total is also relatively high. These characteristics 
are  offsetting  factors  in  the  political  economy 
processes,  which  stress  the  ability  of producers  to 
organise to form  an effective lobby and in  which the 
burden on consumers of the transfers involved is a key 
parameter. Consumer willingness to  pay the taxes on 
agricultural products depends on their significance in 
consumer budgets. The shifts in consumption bundles 
and  the  falling  food  share  in  income  combine  to 
reduce the significance of agricultural output taxes in 
consumer incomes. 
A vision of Chinese food security34 
China over the period of economic reform has enjoyed 
large benefits from movements part of the way toward 
the use of markets for the allocation of resources and 
distribution of commodities in the agricultural sector. 
It has enjoyed an increase in the value of agricultural 
output from greater specialisation in  each locality or 
region (Lin 1996). Production has also increased from 
more efficient allocation  of scarce  inputs  across  and 
within agricultural activities. 
China's  people  have  enjoyed  an  expansion  in 
consumption possibilities across regional and seasonal 
specialities, through growth of wholesale markets and 
34 This section is an edited version of parts of Gamaut (\996). 
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long-distance trade (Xu 1996; Watson 1996). Market 
exchange and long-distance trade have contributed to 
stabilisation  of the  availability of food  in  each area, 
balancing  with  less  cost  and  risk  the  inevitable 
variatIOn  in  agricultural  production.  Also,  the 
internationalisation  of  agricultural  markets,  despite 
being limited in extent, has given China a taste of the 
advantages that would come from going further:  the 
role  that  larger  grain  imports  took  in  dampening 
domestic price increases in  1995  and the contribution 
that  large  variations  in  cotton  imports  and  exports 
have  played  in  balancing  fluctuations  in  domestic 
supply. 
Each  of these  benefits  has  been  limited  by  the 
highly  constrained  and  cyclical  nature  of  the 
movement  towards  a  market  economy.  Local 
governments  have  placed  myriad  barriers  against 
inter-regional trade within China, now reinforced by a 
return to  emphasis on a high degree of regional self-
sufficiency in  grain. The price movements, which are 
central to the role  of markets in equilibrating supply 
and demand for  agriculture  commodities, have been 
constrained from time to time by the re-imposition of 
controls  and  state  purchase  requirements.  Officials 
have observed the rising or falling prices of markets at 
work,  encouraging  or  discouraging  production  and 
consumption,  and  concluded  that  markets  are  not 
working. The role of markets in allocating agricultural 
inputs  has  been  limited.  Also,  integration  into 
international  markets  is  greatly  limited  by  central 
controls  and  the  policy  roles  of  state  trading 
enterpri ses. 
How  would  the  completion  of  the  process  of 
market reform  and  integration  into  the  international 
economy  affect  Chinese  agriculture?  How  would  a 
thoroughly market-oriented Chinese agriculture come 
to  look?  What  additional  improvements  would  be 
achieved  in  Chinese  economic  performance?  What 
problems could be expected to arise? 
To pose these questions is not to presume that the 
completion  of  market  reforms  would  be  easily, 
smoothly or cheaply  achieved.  Indeed, the  stops and 
starts,  the  periodic  retreats  and  the  incomplete 
movements forward  in  the  reforms  are  testimony  to 
the difficulties experienced to date. Vested interests in 
central  and  local  bureaucracies  and  interest  groups 
which stand to  lose from changes that bring benefits 
to  the  country  as  a  whole  have  demonstrated  that 
they  have  important  roles  in  decision-making. 
Nevertheless, to answer the questions about the effect of  full  movement  to  market  exchange  in  the 
agricultural sector is  to provide for  the Chinese who 
hold responsibilities for the national interest a guide to 
the gains to  be had  from  overcoming pressures from 
sectional interests. 
A  Chinese  agricultural  economy  in  which 
allocation  and  distribution  were  regulated  by 
internationally open domestic markets would produce 
more  economic  value  (with  inputs  and  outputs 
appropriately measured in international prices). Some 
land  that  is  still  locked  by  regulatory  arrangements 
into  grain  production  would  shift  into  higher-value 
cash  crops  of  various  kinds.  Fertiliser  production 
would expand until further  increases were  no  longer 
justified  by  factory  profitability  at  market  prices; 
fertiliser use  would expand  until  no  further increase 
would raise farm profitability at market prices; and the 
market would allocate fertiliser to those activities that 
could use  it  profitably  at  market  prices  (Zhang  and 
Zuo, 1996). Inter-regional specialisation and exchange 
would  increase:  in each locality,  production of some 
items would expand and some contract. 
Such  an  agricultural  economy  would be able to 
handle at lower cost, and with less price instability and 
less political tension, the fluctuations  in demand that 
are inevitably associated with the cycle of weaker and 
stronger incomes growth, and the  variation in  supply 
deriving from flood,  drought and other movements in 
seasonal  conditions.  The  stocks  held  in  one  region 
would be  varied in  response to expectations of price 
movements  in  others,  or in  the  country  as  a  whole. 
There would be some balancing of excess demand for 
some  product  in  one  region  with  excess  supply  in 
others,  diminishing  the  extent of equilibrating  price 
movements in both. 
In a  Chinese  agricultural  economy  the  parts  of 
which were linked to each other and to the rest of the 
world through markets, there would be large regional 
variations in prices of agricultural prodncts, reflecting 
differences  in  economic conditions and high costs of 
transport  and  exchange.  Some  regions  would  have 
surpluses  of grain  above  the  requirements  of 
domestic  production,  with  lower  food  prices,  and 
strong  advantages  as  locations  for  processing 
industries.  Prices would  be  higher in  provinces with 
poorer per capita endowments of agricultural land 
in  some  cases  perhaps  above  international  levels. 
Prices  in  the  major  coastal  cities  would  be  closely 
linked  to  international  levels,  influencing  prices 
throughout  China  only  when  domestic  conditions 
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tended to move local  prices away from international 
levels to an extent beyond the bounds of China's high 
internal transport costs. 
Internationally, specialisation and trade would also 
increase, with production in China tending to fall  and 
net  imports  to  rise  of commodities  that  use  land 
relatively  intensively.  Production  would  tend  to  rise 
and net imports to fall at least for a number of years, 
for relatively labour-intensive agricultural products. It 
would probably be the case that  net imports of grain 
would rise and net exports of at least some other foods 
rise at the same time. 
The  internationalisation  would  ease  price 
instability associated with fluctuations in demand and 
supply within China of particular commodities or of 
total agricultural output. 
China  would  share  in  the  changes  in  prices, 
consumption and incentives for production that would 
follow  from  a  large  surge  in  demand  or  shock  to 
supply anywhere in the world. Because the adjustment 
was spread so widely, some shocks would cancel out 
each  other.  The  residual  effect of any  shock  would 
generate  proportionately  smaller  economic 
fluctuations  in  each part of the  international  system 
than  it would in  the region of primary impact if that 
region were closed to the rest of the world. 
In  a Chinese  agricultural  economy  linked to  the 
rest  of the  world  through  markets  there  would  be 
important national international roles for government. 
It  is  a  mistake  to  think  of an  efficient  market 
economy  having  none  or  a  minimal  level  of 
government  intervention,  in  agriculture  at  least  as 
much  as  in  other  areas  of economic  activity.  An 
efficient, market-oriented agricultural economy would 
assign a larger role to government in China than exists 
at  present  in  some  activities,  and  a  smaller role  in 
others.  A  larger  role  is  required  in  setting  and 
enforcing  the  commercial  laws  of  commodity 
exchange,  in  the  retail,  wholesale,  futures  and  other 
markets (Xu  1996), A larger and more effective role 
for  government  is  required  in  agricultural  research, 
extension,  and  provision  of infrastructure  including 
irrigation  services.  The  role  of government  would 
diminish  in  setting  and  controlling  prices,  levels  of 
foreign  trade,  and  the  amount  of  commodity 
composition of production. 
Government  roles,  too,  would  be  important  in 
establishing  conditions  for  efficient  international 
cooperation.  The  arrangements  between  states  that 
govern  international  trade  would  need  to  promote confidence in secure supply.  The role of government 
in  research  to  extend  the  technological  frontiers  of 
agricultural production is  often efficiently performed 
internationally,  as  there  are  large  international 
spillovers  from  research  activity.  The  international 
systemic  benefits  of China's opting for free  trade in 
agriculture  also  justify  some  special  efforts  of 
international  cooperation that  increase  incentives for 
China to move in this direction. 
Detailed empirical research is required to define in 
more  detail  the  shape  of a  market-oriented Chinese 
agricultural  economy.  In  the  nature  of things,  there 
would  be  surprises,  although  there  is  no  reason  to 
expect  the  surprises  to  be  more  bad  than  good. 
Nevertheless,  uncertainty  about  outcomes  generates 
concern  about  adverse  development,  and  caution  in 
reform. 
In  1987,  in  the  course  of  a  long  interview 
subsequently published in full over successive editions 
of the  World  Economic  Herald  in  Shanghai,  Ross 
Garnaut  responded  to  questions  about  the  future  of 
Chinese  reform  with  examples  from  agricultural 
policy. 
'If  China  retains  its  current  level  of  self-
sufficiency in food and other agricultural products', he 
was  accurately  recorded  as  having  said,  'China's 
people will have to  accept a standard of living that is 
in  some  important  respects  low,  even  when  the 
economy  is  productive  in  other  ways.  Much  better 
results  for  the  Chinese  people  would  be  possible  if 
domestic price reform for  agricultural products  were 
accompanied by much closer links between domestic 
and international markets. With this solution, workers 
could enjoy the higher overall standard of living that 
they  will  expect  to  accompany  successful 
modernisation in China'. 
These  and  related  comments  gave  rise  to 
discussion  among  senior  members  of the  Chinese 
Government. Garnaut (1996) refers to the views of Mr 
Du  Runsheng  who  (in  1987)  was  Director  of the 
influential  Research  Centre  for  Rural  Development, 
following a long and distinguished role in agricultural 
policy, including in  relation to  the reforms starting in 
1978.  According  to  Garnaut,  Mr  Du  identified  two 
concerns.  First,  would  an  open  Chinese  agricultural 
policy generate net imports of grain that were so large 
that they led to a substantial increase in world prices, 
reducing radically the gains from trade for China, and 
creating  problems  for  poor  grain-importing 
developing  countries  elsewhere?  Second,  would  the 
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additional foreign exchange requirements of an  open 
agricultural policy be larger than China could expect 
to be able to  meet  securely  by  expansion of labour-
intensive manufactured goods? 
The answer to the first question required answers 
to  several  others.  How  would  Chinese  demand  and 
production expand in  the course of future reform and 
economic growth? How would these developments be 
affected by changes in prices? What prices would need 
to  be  offered  in  international  markets  to  induce the 
expansion of production that  would  be  necessary  to 
meet the requirements of an open Chinese agricultural 
policy? 
The  answer  to  the  second  question  required 
assessment  of  China's  capacity  to  supply  manu-
factured goods competitively onto world markets, and 
of the rest of the world's capacity and willingness to 
absorb  the  required  additional  amounts  of Chinese 
manufactured goods. 
The  consequences  of  integrating  Chinese  and 
international  markets  for  agricultural  products  have 
been discussed a great deal in China and abroad since 
those early conversations. Three other major concerns 
about deep integration into international markets have 
been frequently raised in China. Would the incomes of 
farmers  and  the  rural  popUlation  generally  be  lower 
within an open agricultural policy? Would high levels 
of food imports make China vulnerable to decisions by 
supplying  countries  to  restrict  trade  for  political 
reasons? And would food prices be more unstable if 
there  were  deeper  integration  into  the  international 
agricultural economy') Generally concern has focused 
on the grain situation,  and especially on  good grain, 
rather  than  food  generally,  retlecting  China's  long 
history  of concern for  security  and  price  stability  in 
grain supply. 
Du Runsheng was deeply concerned for farmers' 
incomes, and in  1987 was mindful of several ways in 
which  the  opening  of  the  Chinese  agricultural 
economy to  international  trade  would  be  favourable 
for income distribution. There was considerable scope 
for  raising  farmer  incomes  through  greater  internal 
specialisation within a domestic market economy, and 
through greater export specialisation in  some labour-
intensive  agricultural  products  that  were  likely  to 
expand  in  an  open  economy.  Further,  in  1987, 
domestic  grain  prices  were  well  below  international 
levels, so that internationalisation was likely to lead to 
higher farm prices. Grain and other agricultural products 
Lu Feng (l996a) has broken new ground in analysing 
the relationship between changes in the net exports of 
grain and of other agricultural products in the process 
of thorough-going market refonn and integration into 
the international economy. Lu's analysis leads him to 
the view that an open trade policy in China, supporting 
specialisation  in  line with comparative advantage,  is 
likely to lead to China becoming a large net importer 
of grain,  but  not  a  large  net  importer of food.  Net 
imports of grain would be balanced to a considerable 
extent by net expOlts of their foodstuffs. Free trade is 
unlikely to generate a rnonotonic decline in the  'self-
sufficiency' ratio for all food,  'let alone the alarming 
scenario of China starving the world'. 
Lu  presents  data  that  demonstrate  that  China's 
comparative advantage is much stronger in  fruit and 
vegetables,  aquatic products  and  meat than  in  grain. 
China has a very low per capita endowment of arable 
land compared with the rest of the world, with about 
22% of global population and only about 7% of global 
arable land. The relatively high proportion of China's 
work  force  still  in  fann  employment  makes  the 
relative scarcity of land even more acute. At the same 
time, China has a relatively low per capita endowment 
of capital, with a long history of urban bias making the 
relative  scarcity of capital even  more  acute  in  rural 
areas. Vegetable, fruit,  meat and aquatic products are 
much  more  labour-intensive  than  grain.  Fruit  and 
vegetables utilise almost five times as much labour per 
acre of land as grain. Meat and freshwater fish utilise 
much labour and little arable land. In addition, demand 
for labour in  grain  is  highly  seasonal,  and  the  other 
food production can be organised to  increase demand 
for  labour in  off-peak times.  Moreover,  some of the 
other  foods  can  utilise  land  that  is  unsuitable  or 
marginal for  production. 
Lu observes that for  all of these reasons, China's 
comparative  advantage  is,  as  the  currentlv  relevant 
margin. generally much  stronger in fruit,  ;egetables, 
meat and aquatic products than in grain. The value of 
farm production, valued at international prices, would 
be  greater to  the  extent that  resources  were  shifted 
from grain production to other foods. 
Lu  demonstrates  that  his  propositions  have  an 
empirical  and  not  merely  a  theoretical  basis  by 
examining Taiwan's participation in international food 
trade in  the  course of its  rapid industrialisation from 
the  19608.  Taiwan,  like the  Chinese  mainland,  only 
more  so,  began  its  rapid  economic  growth  with 
59 
relative abundance of labour and relative scarcity of 
arable land. As industrialisation absorbed labour from 
the countryside, farm labour per unit of land became 
less  abundant,  and  is  now  much  lower  than  the 
mainland, while remaining considerably higher than in 
other advanced  economies.  As  is  now  expected  for 
mainland  China,  Taiwan's  net  imports  of  grain 
increased rapidly with industrialisation and integration 
into  the  international  economy,  despite  increasing 
rates of protection for rice production. From a small 
net exporter of cereals in  1965, annual net imports of 
grain were around $US one billion in the early 1990s 
and  $US  1.2  billion  in  1995.  Net  imports  of dairy 
products also rose to about $US 250 million. 
Over  this  same  period,  net  exports  of  fruit, 
vegetables,  aquatic  products  and  meat  rose  rapidly. 
Taiwan's  overall  food  self-sufficiency  in  calorific 
terms declined from  well over 100%  in the  1960s to 
about  40%  in  1990.  Remarkably,  in  value  terms 
Taiwan  remained  a  net  exporter  of food,  albeit  by 
declining amounts, until the 1990s. Net export revenue 
from fruit and vegetables peaked in  1980 and aquatic 
products  at  around  $US  one  billion  in  1990.  Net 
exports of meat continued to rise through the 1990s to 
$US 1.35 billion in  1995. 
Overall, Taiwan's net exports of food have declined 
late in its  industrialisation process as real  labour costs 
have increased. Taiwan  now would have considerable 
comparative disadvantage  relative  to  the  mainland in 
many food products of which it remains a net exporter. 
Lu  notes  that  the  partial  internationalisation  of 
China's food  economy is  already  generating patterns 
of  trade that resemble Taiwan's at an earlier stage in its 
own  rapid  growth.  Grain  and  sugar  imports  have 
reached new peaks in the mid-l 990s, with the highest 
level  of net  grain  imports  in  1995  at 20  mt.  At the 
same time, net exports of all food have increased from 
near zero early in the reform period to $US 2.3 billion 
in  1985 and $US 3.8 billion in 1995. As in Taiwan, net 
exports of meat, fruit, vegetables and aquatic products 
havc grown especially rapidly. 
Lu acknowledges that more research is required to 
define the likely pattern of overall food trade in  the 
process of rapid growth and internationalisation of the 
Chinese economy. He nevertheless is able to conclude 
that Chinese  specialisation  in  line  with comparative 
advantage  is  likely to  generate  high  levels  of other 
food  exports  alongside  grain  imports,  easing  the 
process  of adjustment  to  internationalisation  in  the 
Chinese countryside. Food security: self-sufficiency or 
international cooperation 
We conclude by returning to the question raised by Du 
Runsheng and others, about the effects of integration 
into  the  world  economy.  Should  increases  or 
instability  in  world  prices,  shortages  of  foreign 
exchange,  vulnerability  to  political  blackmail,  or 
concern  about  farmers'  incomes  inhibit  movement 
toward  greater  use  of  rrnlrkets  in  domestic  or 
international  trade?  Would  greater  use  of markets, 
including the world market, lead to more or less food 
security? 
None  of the  recent  work  on  the  Chinese  grain 
economy raises doubts about the presumption that the 
removal of barriers to internal and external trade will 
increase  average  output and  incomes  in  China.  The 
economic growth, to which trade liberalisation would 
contribute, strengthens food security by deepening the 
margins between consumption and subsistence. 
Reccnt work  has tended to  raise  expectations of 
gains in economic efficiency and output from greater 
regional  and  national  specialisation  within the grain 
sector. 
Is  there  a  of  greater  specialisation  in 
international grain trade lifting world prices to levels 
that negate the  That depends on likely levels of 
net  imports  (and  therefore  of  production  and 
consumption)  at  various  grain  prices,  and  on  the 
international  supply  and  demand  responses  to 
variations in world priccs. 
On Chinese grain supply, earlier expectations that 
~rain production  would be highly  sensitive  to  price 
mcreases have been borne out in the experience of the 
mid-1990s.  Research  reviewed  above  has  indicated 
considerable technical capacity  substantially  to  raise 
yields with current frontier technology, but has not yet 
thrown much light on the economic costs of unlocking 
this capacity. The evidence suggests that considerable 
public  investment is  warranted in  research related to 
extending  the  technological  frontier,  in  adapting  to 
Chinese conditions  innovations from  abroad,  and  in 
extension  to  assist  farmers  to  move  closer  to  the 
technological frontier. Some combination of increased 
public  and  private  investment  in  locality-specific 
research  to  define  best  practice  is  justified.  What 
would  these  measures  do  to  total  supply?  The 
measures appear necessary to raise total output in line 
with population over the next decade. 
Total  demand  growth  for  grain  has  been 
interrupted  and  obscured  by  massive  changes  in 
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relative prices in  the first half of the 19908.  Relative 
prices  could  continue  to  increase,  slowing 
consumption growth, if China continues down the path 
of Northeast Asian protectionism, or if world prices 
remain well  above the levels of the early  1990s and 
continue  to  rise.  Otherwise,  strong  demand  growth 
along  the  lines  of mainland  China in  the  1980s  or 
Taiwan  from  the  mid-1960s  to  mid-1970s  can  be 
expected. 
Virtually  ~ll analysts now expect high and rising 
levels of net Imports under 'free trade'  assumptions, 
from the considerable (well above last year's 20 mt) to 
:he  startlingly  large.  The  serious  modelling  and 
mformed  eclectic  analysis  suggest  that  the 
international  economy  can  meet  the  range  of 
possibilities without increases in world prices that are 
so  large  as  to  seriously diminish Chinese gains from 
trade. The large and rapid global grain supply response 
to  the  temporarily  high  prices  of  the  mid-1990s 
underlines the point. 
ShOlt-term  world  price  instability  is  perhaps  a 
greater  concern.  However,  inspection  of  the  data 
reveals  that  in  recent  years  of  high  world 
instability, Chinese domestic prices have varied  even 
more widely. World grain markets will become more 
stable  as  more  large  grain  economies,  China  most 
important of all, are integrated into them. Nothing in 
recent analysis or experience weakens the economists' 
presumption that a wider, global market is likely to be 
more stable than an efficient domestic market. 
Foreign exchange concerns are  less important in 
Chinese grain policy discussion now than in the 19808. 
Chinese labour-intensive industry has sustained strong 
export growth over long periods. International markets 
have revealed a considerable capacity for adjustment, 
and the  regional  and international tradc environment 
looks  more  favourable  for  the  accommodation  of 
increased  Chinese  exports  than  at  any  time  in  the 
reform period. 
The modelling, empirical examination of Chinese 
comparative  advantage  and  the  experience  of 
comparable economies suggest that farm incomes are 
likely  to  be  higher  with  free  trade  than  with  'self-
sufficiency'. Lu Feng's work suggests gains for farm 
incomes beyond those previously anticipated, through 
re  specialisation in labour-intensive activities. It should 
be  noted  as  well  that  grain  protectionism  would 
diminish opportunities for potentially  exports of 
grain-intensive on-farm and  activities that 
utilise farm and other rural labour. The  concern  about  political  conditions  being 
attached  to  grain  trade  has  deep  roots  in  China's 
history of the past half-century. It is worth examining 
carefully the experience of food sanctions in the  post-
war  period,  and  analysing  the  realities  of China's 
vulnerability.  The  United States of America,  during 
the  height of the  Cold  War,  was  unable  to  stem the 
flow  of grain  from  its  alliance  partners  (variously 
Australia,  Canada  and  the  countries  of  Western 
Europe)  to  China  (the  early  1960s)  or  the  former 
Soviet  Union  (the  late  1970s).  There  is  currently 
considerable  diversification  of the  sources  of grain 
supply into the world economy, and this will continue 
with  reform  in  South  Asia,  Latin  America,  Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  All  the serious 
economic  analysis  suggests  that,  under  free  trade, 
Chinese  domestic  grain  production  would  be  well 
above the requirements of subsistence, and a smoothly 
functioning  domestic  market  would  facilitate 
adjustment to the highly unlikely restriction of supply. 
If there  is  continued concern  about  the  political 
reliability of international grain supply,  various steps 
could be taken to reduce the  risk. The mutual interest 
with  supplying  countries  could  be  expected  to 
generate cooperative approaches. One option might be 
35 Article XI of the GAIT rules out quantitative restrictions on 
exports, with some exceptions, and Article XIII rules out 
discriminatory application of such restrictions. 
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to establish supply security provisions in  multilateral 
and bilateral trade agreements. A first step could be to 
examine whether mles on export embargoes that now 
apply  in  the  WT035  would  be  sufficient  to  meet 
China's  concerns  or  whether  a  strengthening  is 
rcquired. Another step is to establish and agree to a set 
of  non-binding  principles  relevant  to  food  supply 
security  in  the  APEC  process.  Perhaps  even  more 
convincingly for China, supplying countries could be 
asked  to  make  a  proportion  of sales  to  China from 
locally held stocks, which would come under Chinese 
control  in  the  event  of irreconcilable  breakdown  in 
political relations. 
The  mutual  interest  in  Chinese  grain  trade 
liberalisation suggests other international cooperation. 
Internationalisation  of grain  markets  would  be  more 
productive for China if world markets especially for 
labour-intensive  foodstuffs  were  opening-up  at  the 
same time. The effective coverage of agriculture in the 
APEC free  trade commitments of Japan, Taiwan and 
Korea is of special importance, 
Finally,  in  the  context  of  mutually  beneficial 
Chinese  grain  trade  liberalisation,  it  would  be 
reasonable  for  China  and  its  partners  to  expand 
cooperation  in  international  public-good  research  in 
agriculture.  The  ACIAR  programs  in  China are  one 
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